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Abstract: This article explores a competition problem that has been long
neglected in the two major competition law jurisdictions, the United States and
the European Union, conglomerate dominance or aggregate concentration. With
their continental scale, the U.S. or the EU economies are unlikely to be dominated
by conglomerates. However, conglomerates have been found to be common in
small economies and emerging economies. Conglomerates no doubt have their
advantages. Yet they also pose some serious economic power issues and distort
competition in a variety of ways, the latter of which has been relatively
unexplored in the literature. This article catalogs these issues and distortions and
proposes two sets of responses to them: direct regulation of conglomerates and
competition law enforcement. These two sets of solutions to some extent alleviate
the detrimental effects of conglomerates. However, they do not get to the root of
the problem, domination of an economy by large conglomerates. Using Hong
Kong as an example, this article illustrates the application of these two sets of
solutions and their limitations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Conglomerates are a competition problem that has been long neglected
in the United States and the European Union (EU), the two leading
competition law jurisdictions in the world. Due to the size of their economies,
they are unlikely to be dominated by any corporate group or groups, no
matter how large these groups are. Yet there are a considerable number of
countries in the world whose economies are dominated by conglomerates. A
survey conducted by this author and collaborator Professor Michal Gal with
the assistance of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
shows that a high percentage of the respondent countries are afflicted by high
aggregate concentration (in fact, half out of the thirty-two of them are). 1 Yet,
in no more than twenty percent of them do their competition laws specifically
address aggregate concentration. 2
One wonders why conglomerates emerge and why they are more
prevalent in some countries than others. There are a number of explanations
for this. One reason is the small size of the economy. Conglomerates are more
likely to emerge in small economies because as a successful firm grows, it
will eventually hit a limit imposed by the size of the market, which is
constrained by the size of the economy. If it wants to continue growing, it
must explore a new market (apart from overseas expansion). Over time, this
firm will branch into more and more sectors until it eventually becomes a
1 Michal S. Gal & Thomas K. Cheng, Aggregate Concentration: A Study of Competition Law
Solutions, 4 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 282, 296 (2016).
2 Id.
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conglomerate. This is especially likely if there is a dominant sector in the
economy that dwarfs other sectors in importance, such as real estate, mining,
or oil and gas. Firms that are successful in these sectors will have sufficient
ammunition to branch out to other sectors. And the heft they have gained in
their large home sector means that they will be very well resourced against
rivals in the new sector. Hong Kong and Israel are some examples of small
economies dominated by conglomerates.
Emerging economies have also been found to have a high incidence of
conglomerates. This may be due to the various advantages of conglomerates
that will be discussed below, such as economies of scale and scope,
overcoming missing institutions, risk sharing, and internal capital and factor
markets, which are particularly relevant in the emerging economy setting.
Firms tend to conglomerate to take advantage of these advantages. And when
some firms start to do that, other firms may do so too as a preemptive
measure. Lastly, conglomerates may emerge as a consequence of a deliberate
government policy. The South Korean government was renowned for
intentionally grooming conglomerates to drive the country’s industrialization
effort. While they made important contributions to the country’s
industrialization, the consensus is that they have outlived their usefulness and
the country is still paying the price of that policy in the form of a high degree
of aggregate concentration.
Given that aggregate concentration or conglomerate dominance is
common in so many countries, one wonders why so few competition laws
have specific provisions to tackle it. One reason could be that no country
seems to have found an effective solution to the problem. Japan and South
Korea have tried some fairly prescriptive rules that directly regulate
conglomerate size and their internal operations, but their effectiveness has
been questioned. There are other ways to tackle conglomerate dominance. In
addition to problems caused by their economic power, conglomerates are
also more prone to a range of anticompetitive practices. Jurisdictions in
which conglomerates dominate should be particularly vigilant against
conglomerates. What this article seeks to explore are what are the advantages
and disadvantages of conglomerates, what are the economic power and
competition issues they raise, and what are the possible solutions to those
issues. It then uses Hong Kong as an example to illustrate how a particular
jurisdiction should deal with conglomerates under its competition law. Hong
Kong is chosen because it is one of the latest advanced economies to have
adopted competition law (in 2012). It is also a place where conglomerates
have been a particularly serious problem; it has consistently topped The
Economist’s Crony Capitalism Index for years, besting even Russia by a
wide margin. Even though Hong Kong is chosen for illustration, the
analytical framework put forward in this article can be readily applied to
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other countries.
This article is divided into seven Parts. After the Introduction, Part II
outlines the various advantages of conglomerates, followed by a discussion
in Part III of their various disadvantages and the economic power issues they
raise. Part IV focuses specifically on how conglomerates are prone to distort
competition through a myriad of anticompetitive conduct. Part V examines
possible responses under competition law to the economic power and
competition issues raised in the previous two Parts. Part VI applies
competition law tools in the specific context of Hong Kong under the recently
enacted Competition Ordinance. Part VII concludes the article.
II. THE ADVANTAGES OF CONGLOMERATES
Before delving more deeply into the issues, it is worthwhile to first
define what exactly a conglomerate is. Khanna and Yafeh define a business
group as consisting of “legally independent firms, operating in multiple
(often unrelated) industries, which are bound together by persistent formal
(e.g., equity) and informal (e.g., family) ties.” 3 Khanna and Rivkin
supplement this definition by observing that members of a business group
“are accustomed to taking coordinated actions.”4 Some commentators
distinguish between conglomerates and corporate groups, using the former
to refer to a firm that operates in multiple sectors by way of internal divisions,
and the latter to refer to a group of companies that do business in multiple
markets. 5 This article draws no such distinction.
At this juncture, it is important to clarify the concepts of conglomerate
dominance and aggregate concentration. The two of them share many
similarities. Both are concerned with the extent to which economic activities
and productive assets are concentrated in the hands of a small number of
economic operators. Various measures of aggregate concentration attempt to
quantify the control exercised by a small number of economic operators over
the economy. However, there is a difference between aggregate
concentration and conglomerate dominance in that the former includes the
largest economic operators in its measurements, drawing no distinction
between whether these operators are single-industry firms or multi-industry
corporate groups, whereas the latter only focuses on conglomerates. 6
3 Tarun Khanna & Yishay Yafeh, Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?,
45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 331, 331 (2007) [hereinafter Khanna & Yafeh I].
4 Randall Morck et al., Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth, 43 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 655, 671 (2005) (quoting Tarun Khanna & Jan W. Rivkin, Estimating the Performance
Effects of Business Groups in Emerging Markets, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 45, 47 (2001)).
5 Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 333.
6 This is important because some of the competition problems observed in Hong Kong for which
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Aggregate concentration usually refers to the economic power issues created
by the sheer size of economic operators. This article uses the term
conglomerate dominance to refer to the anticompetitive potential of
conglomerates in addition to the economic power issues created by them. It
will mainly use the term conglomerate dominance for the sake of
consistency. However, the term aggregate concentration will also be used
when the distinction between the two terms is less important in the context
and aggregate concentration is used in the literature being referred to. This is
especially the case in the discussion about the measurements and
quantification of economic control in the literature, which almost always uses
the term aggregate concentration.
Aggregate concentration is measured in a variety of ways. It is almost
always measured in the form of the amount of something that is held or
accounted for by a certain number of top firms in the economy. The choice
of the number of firms is always somewhat arbitrary, and probably depends
to some extent on the size of the economy. For instance, Berle and Means
chose the top two hundred firms in their measurement of aggregate
concentration. That would be appropriate given the size of the U.S.
economy. 7 However, for an economy like Hong Kong’s or Israel’s, the top
two hundred corporate groups or large firms would probably account for
almost the entire economy. Meanwhile, there are a number of variables that
can be used, such as assets, employment, and value added. Berle and Means
used assets as the variable, which, as Weiss observes, tends to overstate
aggregate concentration, among other problems. 8 Meanwhile, employment
would tend to underestimate aggregate concentration, despite some of its
advantages as a measure.9 Available employment data also do not allow for
accurate measurement and will lead to estimation errors.10 Value added
would be the most appropriate measure for aggregate concentration if one
was concerned about the relative share of economic activity of large
companies. 11 Another advantage of value added is that it is comparable
across sectors, regardless of the nature of economic activity. 12 The problem

conglomerates are allegedly responsible, such as multimarket forbearance and tying, would be much more
likely to take place if the economic operator operates in multiple markets.
7 See Leonard W. Weiss, The Extent and Effects of Aggregate Concentration, 26 J. L & ECON. 429,
430 (1983).
8 See id.; Lawrence J. White, What’s Been Happening to Aggregate Concentration in the United
States? (And Should We Care?) 9–10 (NYU WORKING PAPER No. EC-02-03, 2001),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1292649.
9 See Weiss, supra note 7, at 430.
10 White, supra note 8, at 10.
11 Id. at 8.
12 Id.
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is that value added data are much harder to come by. 13 Therefore, most
measures of aggregate concentration one finds tend to be based on assets,
market capitalization, or GDP.
Conglomerate dominance is manifested in two main ways.
Conglomerates may distort the economy by their sheer size, which may result
in restricted access to capital for small- and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), crowding out of SMEs and entrepreneurs, and outsized political
influence. This article broadly refers to them as economic power issues. They
may also distort the markets by anticompetitive conduct, like every other firm
in the economy. However, by virtue of their multimarket operations and
superior financial resources, there are reasons to believe that they are more
prone to certain anticompetitive practices.
Conglomerates carry a variety of advantages that allow them to be more
efficient in their operations. These advantages include reaping economies of
scale and scope, overcoming the missing institutions problem, provision of
an internal capital and factor market, risk sharing, sharing of brand goodwill,
and facilitating access to the international capital markets. It is important to
evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of conglomerates as it would
allow us to ascertain their net benefits to the economy. If they create net harm
to the economy, regulatory intervention may be called for.
A. Economies of Scale and Scope
Conglomerates often benefit from economies of scale and scope. With
their superior financial resources, conglomerates can ensure that their various
lines of business operate at an optimal scale and reap economies of scale. Of
course, there is nothing about conglomerates that render them uniquely
capable of capturing scale economies. A single-industry firm with the
requisite resources and market share can similarly benefit from economies of
scale. Conglomerates, however, are probably more advantageously
positioned to enjoy economies of scope. A conglomerate that produces
multiple products that share a common technology, component, or knowhow
can benefit from economies of scope by sharing the common element across
the various production lines. Moreover, the different lines of business of a
conglomerate can share their overhead costs, such as accounting costs and
human resource costs. A conglomerate can also achieve bulk discounts in its
purchase of various external professional services such as advertising, public
relations, legal, auditing, consulting services by pulling together the demand
of its various divisions and subsidiaries.
Empirical evidence, however, does not provide overwhelming support
13

Id. at 11.
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on the ability of group companies to enjoy economies of scale. Weiss reports
that “[t]he large conglomerate acquisition of the 1950s and 1960s still
controlled by the acquiring firms in 1975 had profits and growth rates similar
to those of the industries in which they operated. There is little evidence that
such mergers yielded important economies or market power.” 14 Khanna and
Palepu also find that there is no difference in the performance of groupaffiliated and independent firms in India. 15
B. Overcoming Missing Institutions
Another advantage of conglomerates is that by providing opportunities
for intragroup transactions, they obviate the need for transactions with
external parties, which minimizes reliance on the legal and judicial systems
and avoids problems with contract enforcement. Khanna and his coauthors
have been vocal proponents of this strength of conglomerates. Khanna and
Yafeh assert that “[l]imited contract enforcement, weak rule of law,
corruption, and an inefficient judicial system should all lead to high
transaction costs between unrelated parties. Under such circumstances,
intragroup trade, within the context of long-run relationships supported by
family and other social ties, may be relatively cheap and efficient.” 16 This
means that conglomerates should have a particular advantage over
independent firms in countries in which legal institutions are especially weak
and the rule of law cannot be taken for granted. There is in fact some
empirical evidence supporting the notion that corporate groups are more
prevalent in environments in which contracting is more difficult. 17 Khanna
and Palepu find evidence for the conclusion that “the most diversified
business groups add value by replicating the functions of institutions that are
missing in this emerging market.” 18 Evidence from the Philippines is
consistent with this thesis, while evidence from Chile and Indonesia is not. 19
On the whole, the evidence seems to point in different directions.
C. Risk Sharing
Conglomerates have at their disposal superior financial resources,

14

Weiss, supra note 7, at 448.
Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An
Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups, 55 J. FIN. 867, 874 (2000) [hereinafter Khanna & Palepu
I].
16 Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 341.
17 Id. at 348.
18 Khanna & Palepu I, supra note 15, at 887.
19 Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 341.
15
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which make market entry and risk sharing easier. Conglomerates can gather
the financial resources of their various subsidiaries or lines of business to
enter a particular market, which would allow them to enter markets that may
prove too costly for their independent competitors. By virtue of their
diversified operations, conglomerates can also spread operational risks
across their different lines of business. Difficulty in a particular industry is
unlikely to cause an existential threat to a conglomerate given its diversified
operations. Again, there is evidence that corporate groups achieve risk
sharing in some countries. Khanna and Yafeh find that risk sharing is a
characteristic of corporate groups in some countries, such as South Korea,
and to a lesser extent, Thailand and Taiwan. 20 However, they do not find a
clear relationship between the extent of group diversification and the
prevalence of intragroup risk sharing. 21 In contrast, Masulis and his coauthors
note that there is a substantial body of evidence showing that risk sharing is
an important consideration in the ownership decisions within a corporate
group and that family groups benefit from the ability to finance high-risk,
capital-intensive firms that could otherwise have difficulty obtaining external
funding. 22
The flip side of risk sharing is the diversification discount. It is a welldocumented fact that companies with a diverse range of businesses suffer
from a valuation discount as compared to their single-industry peers in the
United States. 23 Therefore, while diversifying into a range of businesses
helps to spread the risks of operation, it also lowers firm value.
Diversification can be both beneficial and costly to shareholders. It can be
beneficial to the extent that the firm or the corporate group possesses certain
attributes, such as unique managerial talent, technology, or group goodwill,
which can be deployed to a range of industries. However, diversification can
be inefficient if it is motivated by a desire for empire building. The evidence
seems to be mixed as to whether diversification is value-enhancing or
reducing. Masulis and his coauthors note that market value for assets and
return on assets are both lower for group companies, family owned or
20 Tarun Khanna & Yishay Yafeh, Business Groups and Risk Sharing around the World, 78 J. BUS.
301, 318 (2005) [hereinafter Khanna & Yafeh II].
21 Id.
22 Ronald W. Masulis et al., Family Business Groups around the World: Financing Advantages,
Control Motivations, and Organizational Choices, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3556, 3579 (2011).
23 Philip G. Berger & Eli Ofek, Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value, 37 J. FIN. ECON. 39, 39
(1994); Raghuram Rajan, Henri Servaes & Luigi Zingales, The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification
Discount and Inefficient Investment, 55 J. FIN. 35, 35 (2000); David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein,
The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment, 55 J. FIN.
2537, 2537 (2000); Karl Lins & Henri Servaes, International Evidence on the Value of Corporate
Diversification, 54 J. FIN. 2215, 2215 (1999). But see John R. Graham, Michael L. Lemmon & Jack G.
Wolf, Does Corporate Diversification Destroy Value?, 57 J. FIN. 695, 695 (2002).
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otherwise, than nongroup companies. 24 Meanwhile, Khanna and Palepu
report no group discount for conglomerates. 25 In fact, in emerging
economies, not only is there no diversification discount, there even seems to
be a premium for corporate diversification. 26 Claessens and his coauthors
find a diversification premium for Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand
and a diversification discount for Hong Kong and Taiwan. 27 This led Khanna
and Yafeh to conclude that diversification discount is inversely related to the
level of development of markets and institutions.28 Khanna and Palepu
discern a U-shaped relationship between diversification and firm
performance. They find that performance of group affiliates declines relative
to independent firms as diversification increases, until a certain threshold is
passed and then the performance surpasses that of independent firms. 29
D. Sharing of Group Goodwill
As mentioned in the discussion of economies of scale and scope,
conglomerates can share common costs and benefits. One of the things that
a conglomerate can share across the group is group reputation and goodwill.
By building a strong brand name for the group, a conglomerate can transfer
the customer recognition garnered in one line of business to another. This
goodwill is particularly helpful when a conglomerate is entering a new
industry. As compared to an independent firm, which would be unfamiliar to
consumers, a conglomerate company can tap into the goodwill that has been
accumulated by other group companies over the years and will be recognized
by consumers right away. Group reputation is especially relevant to groups
that compete internationally. It has been noted that “a brand name is
extremely valuable in export-oriented economies such as Korea’s, where
companies compete against established multinationals for a worldwide

24

Masulis et al., supra note 22, at 3587–89.
Khanna & Palepu I, supra note 15, at 869.
26 Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 336.
27 Stijn Claessens et al., When Does Corporate Diversification Matter to Productivity and
Performance? Evidence from East Asia, 11 PACIFIC BASIN FIN J. 365, 379–82 (2003). The coefficients
for SEGN for Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand are positive while those for Hong Kong and Taiwan
are negative. Note that the results for these economies are statistically insignificant.
28 Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 336.
29 Khanna & Palepu I, supra note 15, at 869, 882. In fact, the existence of a diversification discount
and the evidence that family groups provide valuable support to group companies lead Masulis and his
coauthors to conclude that “group affiliation is subject to an endogenous selection effect,” meaning that
“groups use pyramids to fund particular types of firms that otherwise would find it difficult to obtain
external financing.” Masulis et al., supra note 22, at 3595. Therefore, there is an inherent bias in the
sample of pyramidal group companies such that a direct comparison between them and independent firms
would not be entirely appropriate.
25
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customer base.” 30
Goodwill is not only a factor for consumers, it is also relevant to
contractual counterparties. This is especially the case in countries in which
the legal institutions are weak and the rule of law is suspect. A contractual
counterparty can rely on the general reputation of the group in terms of
upholding contracts and on the fact that a group company would be
particularly hesitant to jeopardize the group’s overall reputation because of
its ramifications for the entire group. As Morck and his coauthors note,
“[w]hen institutions are weak, doing business with strangers is dangerous and
unreliable. This impedes the operation of labor, capital, knowledge, and
product markets. However, families with reputations for fairness and good
management practices are especially sought after as business partners in such
environments.” 31 A group company may seem a more reliable contractual
counterparty.
There is evidence that corporate groups are economically motivated to
cultivate their reputation and protect their goodwill. According to Masulis
and his coauthors, “[c]omparisons of group and non-group firms along
several transparency related dimensions show that group firms are highly
visible to the market, suggesting that they have incentives to protect their
reputations, rather than exploiting a lack of transparency.” 32 Khanna and
Palepu document how India’s Tata Group carefully manages its group
reputation by defining standards and business values that need to be met for
a group company to be allowed to use the Tata name and by sending
independent professionals to conduct periodic business audits to ensure
compliance. 33 Group goodwill is an important asset that is carefully managed
and strategically shared among group members to obtain a competitive
advantage.
E. Provision of Internal Capital Market
Conglomerates perform the important function of providing an internal
capital market for group companies. The conglomerate headquarters often
allocate funds across divisions and subsidiaries and hopefully move internal
funds to their most efficient use within the group. This internal source of
funding is particularly important in countries where the capital markets are
less sophisticated or liquid and where there are serious frictions in these

30 Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, The Right Way to Restructure Conglomerates in Emerging
Markets, HARV. BUS. REV., Jul.–Aug. 1999, at 125, 129 [hereinafter Khanna & Palepu II].
31 Morck et al., supra note 4, at 672.
32 Masulis et al., supra note 22, at 3580.
33 Khanna & Palepu II, supra note 30, at 133.
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markets. 34 This could be the case where there are high information costs in
the domestic capital markets due to poor accounting disclosures or perceived
corporate governance problems, which cause lenders or investors to demand
high returns as compensation for the perceived risks undertaken. In fact,
Almeida and Wolfenzon remark that weak investor protection keeps firms
from raising external finance unless internal funds are available as seed
money. 35 As Khanna and Palepu observe, “[w]hen institutional mechanisms
such as [financial intermediaries and financial regulators] are
underdeveloped or missing, transaction costs rise, and the economy’s scope
for growth is limited accordingly.” 36 Information costs are minimized within
a conglomerate due to the common ownership of the borrower and the lender.
Common control of the borrower would give the lender access to accurate
financial information about the borrower that may otherwise be unavailable
to an external lender. Therefore, an internal lender will demand a lower rate
of return and an internal borrower can obtain funds at lower costs. The
internal capital market is not only valuable to young, risky, fast-growing
firms that may face serious liquidity constraints,37 but it has also been shown
to be similarly relevant for mature, slow-growing firms. 38
Empirical evidence confirms that internal capital markets exist within
corporate groups 39 and that corporate groups are more common in emerging
markets where legal institutions are weak and the capital markets are still
developing. 40 India’s Tata Group is an example of how such an internal
capital market works effectively. 41 Evidence from both Chile and South
Korea lends support to the notion that as financial markets become more
mature and sophisticated, the benefits of being part of a diversified corporate
group are eroded. 42 In fact, the role of the internal capital market in helping
to solve information problems has been confirmed in Japan as well. 43 Hoshi
and his coauthors find that in Japan, investments by independent firms are
much more sensitive to liquidity. 44 Furthermore, studies have shown that
34 Stijn Claessens, Joseph P. H. Fan & Larry H. P. Lang, The Benefits and Costs of Group Affiliation:
Evidence from East Asia, 7 EMERGING MARKET REV. 1, 2 (2006); Khanna & Palepu II, supra note 30, at
126; Morck et al., supra note 4, at 671.
35 Heitor V. Almeida & Daniel Wolfenzon, A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business
Groups, 61 J. FIN. 2637, 2666–67 (2006).
36 Khanna & Palepu II, supra note 30, at 126.
37 Masulis et al., supra note 22, at 3560.
38 Claessens, Fan & Lang, supra note 34, at 17.
39 Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 339.
40 Id. at 2.
41 Morck et al., supra note 4, at 689.
42 Khanna & Palepu II, supra note 30, at 133; Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 338.
43 Takeo Hoshi et al., Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese
Industrial Groups, 106 Q.J. ECON. 33, 34 (1991).
44 Id. at 36.
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“external capital availability is negatively correlated with the prevalence of
family groups across economies, especially those organized under a
pyramidal structure.” 45 Therefore, the internal capital markets within
corporate groups both help to remedy the illiquidity of the external capital
markets and to reduce the information costs of lending.
However, not all is positive about the internal capital market function
of conglomerates. First, some studies have cast doubt on whether the
provision of funding by a conglomerate will necessarily improve the
profitability of member companies. Weiss reports that conglomerates do not
seem to be allocating more funds to more profitable businesses and that firm
product growth almost depends entirely on industry growth. 46 Second, and
more importantly, some commentators have argued that efficient allocation
of capital within conglomerates may actually distort the overall allocation of
capital across the economy. 47 A controlling shareholder in a conglomerate
has incentives to over allocate capital to internal projects and to ignore
external projects that may be even more profitable than internal ones. Shin
and Park have argued that the internal capital markets within Korean
chaebols (conglomerates) are in fact inefficient and result in overinvestment
in group companies with unprofitable investment opportunities. 48 A related
line of criticism is that the pooling of finances among group companies and
the provision of debt guarantees by group companies for each other’s external
debts obfuscates the economics of individual companies and subsidizes
unprofitable businesses. 49 In Japan, it has been observed that the internal
funding from keiretsu [Japanese corporate groups] keeps afloat unprofitable
businesses and results in inefficient use of capital. 50 It has been asserted that
the overall welfare impact of internal capital markets within corporate groups
is ambiguous. 51
F. Provision of Internal Factor Market
Apart from providing an internal capital market, a conglomerate can
also provide an internal market for other factors of production such as labor
and managerial talent. This, again, is an advantage that is more applicable to
emerging economies. It has been observed that “[i]n economies where
45

Masulis et al., supra note 22, at 3559.
Weiss, supra note 7, at 447.
47 Morck et al., supra note 4, at 675.
48 Hyun-Han Shin & Young S. Park, Financing Constraints and Internal Capital Markets: Evidence
from Korean Chaebols, 5 J. CORP. FIN. 169, 171 (1999).
49 Khanna & Palepu II, supra note 30, at 132.
50 See Sadahiko Suzuki & R. Wright, Financial Structure and Bankruptcy Risks in Japanese
Companies, 16 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 97 (1985).
51 Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 339.
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external markets for professional managers are thin and underdeveloped, a
group’s internal market structure can lead to more investment in recruiting,
training, and greater incentives for employees to develop ‘group specific
human capital.’” 52 In countries such as South Korea, India, and Chile, the
availability of professional managerial education is limited while the demand
for managerial talent far outstrips supply. 53 What some corporate groups,
such as Samsung in South Korea, have done is build an internal managerial
market and provide extensive training for managers by bringing in worldclass faculty. 54 A conglomerate can afford to do that because it achieves
economies of scale in the provision of managerial training. Due to its size
and diverse operations, the number of managers who need to be trained at
any given point in time is bound to be large and its superior financial
resources allow it to build a top-notch program. Another advantage of a
conglomerate is that the general managerial skills of its employees can be
deployed in different lines of business, 55 especially when entering a new
market. This helps to smooth market entry by providing a readily available
pool of managerial talent. The now-defunct Korean chaebol, Daewoo, is a
prime illustration of that.56 Khanna and Palepu find evidence that in Chile
and India, the enhanced profitability of group companies is primarily due to
advantages in labor and factor markets. 57
G. Facilitating Access to International Capital Markets
Some commentators have reported that conglomerates have
disproportionately good access to the international capital markets. For
example, Indian group companies tend to enjoy privileged access to the
international capital markets. 58 This is hardly surprising, as international
lenders will seek out trustworthy borrowers with sufficient assets as
collaterals for the loans. And given the size and prominence of these group
companies in the domestic economy, the international lenders will have
greater confidence in their creditworthiness. First, these group companies are
more likely than smaller domestic stand-alone firms to have a substantial
international reputation, being often reported in the international press.
Second, given the size of these conglomerates and the number of people they
52

Morck et al., supra note 4, at 672.
Khanna & Palepu II, supra note 30, at 129.
54 Id.
55 Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 336.
56 Khanna & Palepu II, supra note 30, at 129.
57 Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, Policy Shocks, Market Intermediaries, and Corporate Strategy:
The Evolution of Business Groups in Chile and India, 8 J. ECON. MGMT. STRATEGY 271, 275–76 (1999)
(hereinafter Khanna & Palepu III).
58 Khanna & Palepu I, supra note 15, at 870, 885.
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employ, the international lenders may rightly or wrongly believe that the
conglomerates’ national governments will not let them fail if they run into
financial trouble, because of the possible implications on domestic
employment. For example, the Tata Group employs 600,000 people. 59
Samsung reportedly employed 275,000 people as of September 2014. 60
Third, conglomerates that are active in the international markets are more
likely to have adopted international accounting and corporate governance
standards, which will give their lenders greater confidence. Fourth, given the
overall size of these conglomerates, the size of any particular loan will be
quite small in comparison. So long as the lenders ask for a guarantee from
the assets of other affiliates, their loans will benefit from a larger pool of
collateral. Likewise, conglomerates are also likely to have better access to
the international equity capital markets. A firm that has a global reputation is
much more likely to be successfully listed in overseas stock exchanges than
an obscure domestic firm. It will be easier for an internationally known firm
to attract retail investors, which could be key to a successful listing.
The question is, how does the domestic economy benefit from the
improved access to international capital markets of conglomerates? To the
extent that conglomerates’ access to international capital markets frees up
domestic capital, other firms may benefit by having greater access to funds.
It was mentioned earlier that the development of internal capital markets
within conglomerates may distort domestic overall capital allocation. If
conglomerates are now more willing to release their own capital to the
domestic economy (perhaps because they are able to earn a greater return
from lending to other domestic firms than the interest they pay in the
international capital market), this overall domestic distortion will be
alleviated. In a way, these internationally reputable conglomerates serve as
conduits of foreign capital to the domestic economy.
III. THE DISADVANTAGES OF CONGLOMERATES—
ECONOMIC POWER CONCERNS
Conglomerates also bring with them a host of disadvantages, some of
which are more of a corporate governance or general economic nature, some
of which are more related to competition. The former ones include high
agency costs, crowding out of SMEs and entrepreneurs, distortion of access
to financial markets, overall welfare effects, and political economy concerns.
Agency costs, and the related problems of pyramidal structure and tunneling,
59

See Tata Group, Tata Fast Facts, http://www.tata.com/pdf/Tata_fastfacts_final.pdf.
Ron Amadeo, Samsung has more employees than Google, Apple, and Microsoft combined, ARS
TECHNICA (Sept. 25, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2014/09/samsung-has-more-employees-thangoogle-apple-and-microsoft-combined/.
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are corporate governance-related. The remainder of these disadvantages can
be said to fall under the rubric of economic power concerns, meaning they
are the inherent consequences of the size and breadth of conglomerates. This
Part and Part IV will survey the various disadvantages and competition
problems of conglomerates. Part V will attempt to offer some solutions.
A. Corporate Governance Problems—High Agency Costs
The high agency costs of conglomerates arise from the fact that many
of them use the pyramidal structure, under which a holding company owns a
stake in subsidiaries, which in turn own stakes in subsidiaries, so on and so
forth. Assuming that at every level the controlling shareholder owns 50%
plus one share, by the third level, the holding company will only have 12.5%
of the cash flow rights. 61 However, by virtue of its majority stake at every
level, it will retain control rights over every subsidiary. According to
Bebchuk and his coauthors, pyramidal structures combine the incentive
problems associated with both controlled structure and dispersed ownership
in a single ownership structure. 62 It is believed that “the agency costs
imposed by controlling shareholders who have a small minority of the cashflow rights in their companies can be an order of magnitude larger than those
imposed by controlling shareholders who hold a majority of the cash-flow
rights.” 63 What makes matters worse is that in most public companies, a stake
much smaller than majority is often enough to confer control because the
individual shareholders seldom if ever vote in annual meetings. 64 It has been
estimated that a voting stake of ten to twenty percent is sufficient to confer
control. 65 For example, the famous Swedish family, the Wallenbergs, has
voting control over ABB, an international engineering giant, while retaining
61 Pyramidal structures create significant agency costs because of the divergence between control
rights and cash-flow rights. The problem is particularly acute when there is a project that generates
substantial private benefits to the controlling shareholder, but only mediocre benefits for shareholders as
a whole. The controlling shareholder will have the incentive to divert resources to pursue non-profitmaximizing projects that generate significant private benefits, which he alone keeps. Meanwhile, the
controlling shareholder will have little incentive to maximize firm value as he only retains a small portion
of the value through his small cash-flow rights. This state of affairs harms existing shareholders by
denying them profit-maximizing projects and also raising their financing costs. Outside investors will
expect opportunistic behavior by the controlling shareholder of a pyramidal structure and demand a higher
rate of return for it. See Morck et al., supra note 4, at 676.
62 Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The
Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF
ECONOMIC RESEARCH CONFERENCE REPORT: CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295 (Randall K.
Morck ed., 2000).
63 Id. at 296.
64 Morck et al., supra note 4, at 661–64.
65 Id.
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only 5% of the cash flow rights. 66 Claessens and his coauthors find that a
20% stake is sufficient to control most Asian companies. 67 Control is further
augmented by placing family members in senior executive positions within
the group, which is common in Asian companies. 68
Not every conglomerate, however, uses the pyramidal structure.
Pyramidal structures are popular in some countries but not in others. For
example, pyramidal groups are widely found in South Korea, Thailand,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, and Mexico, 69 while they are almost
completely absent in Austria and Czech Republic. 70 In their global survey of
28,635 firms in 45 countries, Masulia and his coauthors find that about onethird of corporate groups employ the horizontal structure while two-thirds of
them adopt the pyramidal structure. 71 Claessens and his coauthors find that
only a quarter of non-widely held companies in Hong Kong are controlled
through pyramidal structures. 72 However, a casual survey conducted by this
author shows that the pyramidal structure is very common among the leading
conglomerates in Hong Kong.
The controlling shareholder can also pursue what is known as tunneling,
which consists of diverting assets and income to the higher-tiered firms
within the pyramidal structure and dumping losses and liabilities to the
lower-tiered firms. 73 Despite it being a widely discussed phenomenon in the
academic literature, Khanna and Yafeh note that the empirical evidence on
the prevalence and severity of tunneling is far from clear. 74 In particular,
Cheung and his coauthors find that tunneling does not seem to be a serious
problem among conglomerates in Hong Kong. 75 This is consistent with the
finding of studies that indicates that the control premium in Hong Kong is
very low (in fact it was found to be negative), which suggests that there is
adequate protection for minority shareholders, including from tunneling, in
Hong Kong. 76
Finally, the pyramidal structure can also produce what is known as the
entrenchment effect, which essentially allows the controlling shareholder to
66

Id. at 665.
Claessens, Fan & Lang, supra note 34, at 5–6.
68 Morck et al., supra note 4, at 665.
69 Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 346.
70 See Masulis et al., supra note 22, at 3568.
71 Id. at 3569–70.
72 Claessens, Fan & Lang, supra note 34, at 14.
73 Morck et al., supra note 4, at 679.
74 Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 346.
75 Yan-Leung Cheung et al., Tunnelling, Propping, and Expropriation: Evidence from Connected
Party Transactions in Hong Kong, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 343, 383–84 (2006).
76 Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis,
68 J. FIN. ECON. 325, 334 (2003).
67
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enjoy the private benefits of control robustly, without worrying about the
possibility of takeover or reaction from minority shareholders. 77 Morck and
his coauthors describe control pyramids as “simple and highly effective
antitakeover devices,” 78 obviating the need for other antitakeover
mechanisms such as the poison pill or staggered boards. This is a classic
problem for a firm with a controlling stake, and there is considerable
empirical evidence for it. 79 However, what makes it worse for pyramidal
structures is that such structures suffer both from this problem and the
separation of ownership and control that afflicts firms with dispersed
ownership.
B. Distortion of Access to Financial Markets
As explained earlier, the fact that conglomerates engender an internal
capital market can distort allocation of capital economy-wide. According to
Almeida and Wolfenzon, this is largely due to financial market imperfections
caused by inadequate investor protection and the weak pledgeability of
capital by a controlling shareholder to an outside investor in a weak investor
protection regime. 80 Intuitively, the distortion arises from the fact that a
controlling shareholder cannot credibly commit to a certain return to capital
following an investment. Therefore, whatever return the controlling
shareholder commits to, it will always be subject to a discount. A
conglomerate that may have capital to spare faces two options: one is to
deploy the capital internally to a less profitable project, and the other is to
lend capital to an outside firm that has a more profitable use of the capital,
and can promise a higher return to the conglomerate than what the internal
project can generate. 81 However, after the inadequate investor protection
discount, the return to the conglomerate may now be lower than the return
from its internal project.82 The conglomerate thus would choose the internal
77

Morck et al., supra note 4, at 677.
Id.
79 See, e.g., W. Bruce Johnson et al., An Analysis of Stock Price Reaction to Sudden Executive
Deaths: Implications for Managerial Labor Market, 7 J. ACCT & ECON. 151 (1985); Myron B. Slovin &
Marie E. Sushka, Ownership Concentration, Corporate Control Activity, and Firm Value: Evidence from
the Death of Inside Blockholders, 48 J. FIN. 1293 (1993); Paolo F. Volpin, Governance with Poor Investor
Protection: Evidence from Top Executive Turnover in Italy, 64 J. FIN. ECON. 61 (2002); Igor Filatotchev
et al., Privatization, Insider Control and Managerial Entrenchment in Russia, 7 ECON. OF TRANSITION
481 (1999); Abe De Jong & Chris Veld, An Empirical Analysis of Incremental Capital Structure Decisions
under Managerial Entrenchment, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 1857 (2001); Mine Ugurlu, Agency Costs and
Corporate Control Devices in the Turkish Manufacturing Industry, 27 J. ECON. STUD. 566 (2000).
80 Hector Almeida & Daniel Wolfenzon, Should Business Groups Be Dismantled? The Equilibrium
Costs of Efficient Internal Capital Markets, 79 J. Fin. Econ. 99, 104–05 (2006).
81 Id.
82 Id.
78
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project even though on an economy-wide basis, the external project would
be more efficient. Inadequate investor protection hence creates a bias for
internal projects, which reduces allocative efficiency even though the internal
capital markets within conglomerates may be efficient.83 This allocative
distortion would be particularly serious if there was a dearth of capital
available to outside firms. In fact, Almeida and Wolfenzon argue that the
more efficient is the internal capital allocation, the greater is the economywide allocative distortion.84
Knowing this allocation distortion in the external market, firms will
have greater incentives to conglomerate in order to reduce their reliance on
the external capital market. 85 This in turn gives other firms the incentive to
conglomerate preemptively, which creates a positive feedback mechanism
for conglomeration. 86 It has been observed that following the reforms of
chaebols in South Korea, which included the breakup of the Daewoo Group,
hitherto one of the largest conglomerates in South Korea, capital availability
to independent firms improved. 87 Such reforms are likely to face resistance
because the existing conglomerates will use their political influence to lobby
against improving investor protection to preserve their financing advantages.
Morck and his coauthors observe that “to preserve their privileged positions
under the status quo, such elites might invest in political connections to
stymie the institutional development of capital markets and to erect a variety
of entry barriers. These economywide implications can be serious.” 88 They
postulate that this phenomenon, which they call economic entrenchment, is
a positive feedback loop, “whereby weak institutions place sweeping
corporate governance powers in the hands of a tiny elite group, who then
lobby for weak institutions to preserve their concentrated control over the
countries large corporations.” 89
83

Id.
Id. at 116–17.
85 Id. at 102.
86 Id. Preemptive conglomeration ultimately generates multiple equilibrium levels of
conglomeration. Almeida and Wolfenzon further observe that “countries with intermediate investor
protection might be stuck in an equilibrium with too much conglomeration. The same institutional
environment can support two very different equilibria in terms of the degree of conglomeration and the
efficiency of capital allocation. However, even if the low conglomeration equilibrium is socially superior,
there might be no natural mechanism to allow the economy to move to the more desirable equilibrium.”
Id. at 125–26. In that case, they suggest that direct government intervention, including a possible breakup
of the conglomerates, may be necessarily to move the economy to a more allocatively efficient
equilibrium. Id. at 126.
87 Id. at 129–30.
88 Morck et al., supra note 4, at 657.
89 Id. at 711. Another way in which conglomerates can distort access to capital is when its sheer size
relative to the rest of the economy is such that they attain a certain degree of price setting power in the
domestic capital market. In fact, Morck and his coauthors postulate that when a conglomerate decides
84
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C. Crowding out of SMEs and Entrepreneurs
The flip side of the advantage of a conglomerate’s superior financial
resources is that these same resources allow conglomerates to squeeze out
SMEs and render entrepreneurship increasingly difficult. It is obviously very
difficult for SMEs to compete with a well-funded subsidiary of a
conglomerate, which can reap substantial economies of scale and source
inputs at substantial bulk discount. In a small economy in particular, if
conglomerates are seen to embrace every profitable business opportunity and
go after every profitable sector, it will have a deterrent effect on
entrepreneurship. This is because budding entrepreneurs may reasonably
think that as soon as they enter a promising line of business, the
conglomerates will follow suit with superior financial resources. Morck and
his coauthors assert that “entrusting the governance of huge slices of a
country’s corporate sector to a tiny elite can bias . . . obstruct entry by outside
entrepreneurs, and retard growth.” 90 Weiss postulates that “if a very large
firm enters a market made up of small firms, its size will intimidate the other
firms in the market, and thus dampen competition.” 91
D. Overall Economic Welfare Effects
A number of commentators have argued that conglomerates could lead
to suboptimal economic performance and overall welfare loss. This is largely
due to the size of the conglomerates in relation to the overall economy. If a
small number of families control conglomerates that account for a substantial
part of the economy, their suboptimal behavior may become a
macroeconomic problem. Poor corporate governance in a select few firms
take on systemic importance when the firms involved span the economy. This
was very much the case in South Korea during the Asian Financial Crisis,
when it was discovered that corporate governance issues in the chaebols led
to extensive over-leveraging, which threatened to jeopardize the overall
economy. 92 Shleifer and Wolfenzon posit that the agency costs created by the
whether to supply capital to an external user, it may consider the impact of the investment on its capital
market power as the investment may allow the external user to accumulate wealth. Id. at 688. This may
result in further allocative inefficiency in the economy, augmenting the distortionate effect described in
the previous paragraphs. However, this is admittedly unlikely to happen unless the economy is relatively
small or the conglomerate at issue is truly dominant in size.
90 Id. at 657.
91 Weiss, supra note 7, at 437. However, Weiss did not find much correlation between absolute firm
size and the profitability of conglomerates, leading him to conclude that this problem, which he terms
entrenchment, to be insignificant. Id. at 442.
92 Jong-Sung You, Transition from a Limited Access Order to an Open Access Order: The Case of
South Korea, in IN THE SHADOW OF VIOLENCE: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE PROBLEMS OF
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misappropriation of wealth by controlling shareholders raise costs of capital
to the whole corporate sector and thus impede growth. 93 It also has been
argued that the capital market distortion resulting from conglomerate
dominance may alter overall investment level, skew the capital expenditure
across projects, firms, and groups, and may ultimately compromise economic
growth. 94
There are divergent views on the overall welfare effects of
conglomerates in the economy. Studies have been conducted on the relative
performance of group firms versus independent firms. Their results are
varied. Some studies report that pyramidal groups outperform independent
firms in emerging economies. 95 As reported earlier, there seems to be a
diversification premium in some emerging economies, which lends strength
to the argument that group firms have superior performance. In some other
countries, the relative performance of group firms and independent firms has
evolved over time. The Korean chaebols used to be traded at a premium until
around 1994, when the premium became a discount. 96 And these chaebols
exhibited worse performance than independent firms during the Asian
Financial Crisis. 97 However, these firm-specific comparisons do not shed
much light on the overall welfare effects of conglomerates as their superior
performance may be due to the advantages they obtain, such as from
distortion of the capital market, which would undermine overall social
welfare. Some studies attempt to measure the overall effects of
conglomerates directly. While most commentators seem to agree that the
welfare effects of conglomerates are negative, Khanna and Yafeh argue that
their impact on social welfare is ambiguous and circumstance-specific. 98
E. Political Economy Concerns
Apart from problems of purely economic nature, conglomerates also
raise political economy issues. These issues arise from the fact that
conglomerates will inevitably attempt to influence the government to obtain
their desired policy outcomes. As mentioned earlier, conglomerates may
DEVELOPMENT 293, 309–10 (Douglass C. North et al. ed., 2013); see also Chee Keong Low, A Road Map
for Corporate Governance in East Asia, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 165, 166 (2004).
93 Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and Equity Markets, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 3,
16 (2002).
94 Morck et al., supra note 4, at 693.
95 See, e.g., Tarun Khanna & Jan W. Rivkin, Estimating the Performance Effects of Business Groups
in Emerging Markets, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT J. 45, 57 (2001).
96 Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 337.
97 Jae-Seung Baek et al., Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from the Korean
Financial Crisis, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 265, 270 (2004).
98 Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 334.
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lobby the government to maintain poor investor protection so as to preserve
their power and influence. They may lobby for policies that preserve or
expand their corporate governance powers and to shield them from
challenges by the minority shareholders in order to sustain their control. This
is important because what determines their influence is not what they own,
but what they control. 99 So long as they maintain the current state of affairs
under which they can control a company with 10% to 20% of the voting
shares and can control companies further down the pyramid structure with
even less cash-flow rights, they will preserve their political clout. Pyramids
are said to magnify political influence the same way they magnify corporate
control. 100 In addition to lobbying for policies to help protect their corporate
control, conglomerates will also demand measures that will shield them from
competition, such as trade barriers or favorable licensing policies that help
keep potential rivals out of the market.
What makes lobbying by conglomerates particularly worrying is their
size, which allows them to reap economies of scale and scope in political
lobbying. 101 As Ayal observes, “‘the larger the firm, the easier for it to
overcome the fixed cost of lobbying, and the higher the returns will be’. Fixed
costs are one of the contributing factors to economies of scale, and when
returns are proportional to affected size . . . , size does matter.” 102 He further
observes that “[t]he larger the affected interest, the more prominent are
economies of scale. The more interests affected, in multiple industries, the
more prominent are economies of scope.” 103 Given the size of a
conglomerate’s business interest, the affected interest is obviously large.
Therefore, the economies of scale will be substantial. And given the range of
industries a conglomerate operates in, the economies of scope will be
significant as well.
Apart from substantial economies of scale and scope, which render them
particularly effective lobbyists, conglomerates also benefit from financial
advantages. With the substantial financial resources at their disposal,
conglomerates can offer hefty upfront payments to government officials,
which would be beyond the reach of smaller firms. 104 Moreover, a
conglomerate owner, by virtue of its common control, can effectively
overcome the collective action problem and marshal the resources of the

99

Morck et al., supra note 4, at 674.
Id. at 657.
101 Adi Ayal, The Market for Bigness: Economic and Competition Agencies’ Duty to Curtail It, 1 J.
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 221, 225 (2013).
102 Id. at 227.
103 Id. at 226.
104 Morck et al., supra note 4, at 695.
100
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various group companies to finance the lobbying activities. 105 In contrast, a
trade association that contains the same number of independent firms as
members would face much greater obstacles due to the free-rider problem.
The controlling shareholder of a conglomerate can also make use of tunneling
to reap the direct benefits of lobbying while offloading the lobbying costs to
minority shareholders. 106 Such tunneling can greatly increase the costeffectiveness of lobbying for conglomerate owners.
In addition, with their deep pocket and political connections,
conglomerates tend to outlast independent firms, which allows them to
operate as long-term repeat players in the lobbying game. Conglomerates can
thus build longer lasting relationships with government officials and render
their longer-term promises, such as a promise of postretirement employment,
more credible. It has also been argued that family-controlled conglomerates
have stronger incentives over time to use lobbying to maintain their economic
position. This is because over time, the entrepreneurial abilities and
managerial skills of the descendants of the founders of family-owned
conglomerates should regress to the population mean. 107 When they can no
longer compete with their business acumen, these conglomerates will resort
to political means to protect their competitive position.
There is empirical evidence that shows that family-owned
conglomerates exercise outsized political influence. Morck and Yeung find
a significant correlation between signs of political influence and family
control. 108 Countries with a considerable number of family-owned
conglomerates have poor compliance with tax law, high degree of corruption,
poor judicial efficiency, inefficient bureaucracy, and high regulatory barriers
to entry. 109 Jacobs finds that “aggregate concentration of assets . . . has a
strong negative influence on effective corporate tax rates.”110 The larger the
firms in the economy, the greater their ability to lobby for lower corporate
tax rate. His study leads Jacobs to conclude that “aggregate concentration
leads to political distortions that may outweigh these technical advantages
[of conglomerates]. It is dangerous in any democratic political system for a
few to have political influence that clearly outweighs all others.” 111
Meanwhile, some studies have cast doubt on the correlation between
105

Id.
Id. at 696.
107 See generally Francesco Caselli & Nicola Gennaioli, Dynastic Management (NBER WORKING
PAPER No. 9442, 2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9442.
108 Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Family Control and the Rent-Seeking Society, 28
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY AND PRACTICE 391, 402 (2004).
109 Id.
110 David Jacobs, Corporate Economic Power and the State: A longitudinal Assessment of Two
Explanations, 93 AM. J. SOC. 852, 852 (1988).
111 Id. at 877.
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aggregate concentration and influence on policies. 112
IV. CONGLOMERATE DISTORTION OF COMPETITION
Apart from economic power concerns derived from the sheer size and
operation of conglomerates, conglomerates are also susceptible to a range of
competition-distorting conduct, which, by virtue of their multimarket
operations and size, conglomerates are better positioned than other firms to
perpetrate. The particular anticompetitive potential of conglomerates has
been relatively unexplored in the literature. It is important to examine this
potential in order to formulate the appropriate competition law response to
conglomerates. These include mutual interdependence, parallel exclusion,
interlocking directorate, predatory pricing, tying, exploitative practices, entry
deterrence or loss of potential competition, and cross-subsidization. The first
three implicate multifirm conduct, while the remainder are unilateral
behavior. It is possible to rely on traditional competition law tools to address
some of them. For the rest, there are perhaps no ways to tackle them short of
banning the corporate group structure or placing direct restrictions on the
growth and internal operations of conglomerates. Of course, not every
conglomerate will commit these anticompetitive practices. The argument is
only that conglomerates are more likely than stand-alone firms to commit
them. Some of these competition problems, in fact, are only applicable to
conglomerates.
A. Multifirm Conduct
A conglomerate on its own obviously does not give rise to concerns
about multifirm conduct. But when there are a number of conglomerates and
they operate in multiple markets against each other, their repeated interaction
in multiple markets makes multifirm conduct among them a serious issue.
This is because conglomerates do not exist in isolation. If the economic
conditions or historical development of a country are conducive to the
emergence of conglomerates, there is usually more than one of them. If these
conglomerate companies are simply engaged in price fixing or other forms
of cartel conduct, existing competition law is well equipped to tackle such
conduct. However, because of the repeated interaction among conglomerate
companies, it may be easier for them to coordinate their conduct short of
express collusion. This is where existing competition law falls short.
Moreover, repeated interaction of conglomerates within multiple markets
112 See, e.g., Lester Salaman & John Siegfried, Economic Power and Political Influence, 71 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 1026, 1031 (1977).
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also means that they are more likely to act in parallel with each other. If the
parallel conduct excludes new rivals, what arises is what Hemphill and Wu
have called parallel exclusion. This is a genuine competition concern but has
thus far not been fully recognized as such.
1. Mutual Interdependence
Conglomerates have been said to promote mutual interdependence and
to facilitate multimarket collusion. 113 Bernheim and Whinston argue that
“multimarket contact relaxes the incentive constraints governing the implicit
agreements between firms, and that this has the potential to improve firms’
abilities to sustain collusive outcomes” and that “multimarket contact allows
the development of ‘spheres of influence,’ which enable firms to sustain
higher levels of profits and prices.” 114 A number of scenarios can lead to such
interdependence. The first involves members of conglomerates competing
with each other in a number of markets. The idea is that when firms interact
and compete in multiple markets, it will be easier for them to police a cartel
formed in any particular market. Deviation in one market will invite
retaliation in multiple markets, which will magnify the pain that fellow cartel
members can inflict upon the cheater.
Bernheim and Whinston, however, have criticized this theory by
arguing that the possibility of multimarket punishment does not deter
cheating; it will simply cause the cheater to cheat in all markets.115 They
propose a different reason for why multimarket contact can facilitate
collusion. They argue that so long as there are different numbers of firms in
different markets or the firms attach more weight to future outcomes in some
markets than in others, the conglomerates can pool together their incentive
constraints across markets and use their surplus enforcement power in one
market to discipline a cartel member in a different market. 116 In particular,
they argue that multimarket contact may allow firms to transfer their
enforcement power from a rapidly growing market to a slowly growing
market (the consequence of punishment becomes more important in a rapidly
growing market because it happens in the future), from a market in which
actions are directly observable and immediately punishable to markets in
which there are substantial detection and punishment lags, or from a market
113 Mutual interdependence only arises in the conglomerate context when the same set conglomerates
operate in the same markets, which obviously need not be the case. To the extent that different
conglomerates operate in different markets, mutual interdependence will be less of a concern.
114 B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Multimarket contact and collusive behavior, 21
RAND J. ECON. 1, 2 (1990).
115 Id. at 3.
116 Id. at 6–8.
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with low demand to a market with high demand (it has been argued that
collusion is countercyclical, and therefore it is easier to sustain collusion in
low demand). 117
Apart from increasing the leverage of the cartelists over each other,
multimarket contact can also facilitate collusion by increasing the level of
trust among potential cartel members. When the conglomerates have been
coexisting in the economy for a long time and interact with each other in
multiple markets, they are more likely to have built up a certain level of trust
among themselves over the years. This would make it easier for them to reach
a consensus on the terms of collusion and obviate the need for direct
communication before those terms can be reached. The level of trust is likely
to be even higher if the conglomerates are owned by powerful families, who
are likely to have personal relationships with each other. This means that both
express collusion and tacit collusion would be easier.
Mutual interdependence need not lead to collusion. It may merely cause
the conglomerate members to compete with each other less. Conglomerate
members may compete with each other in some markets and may supply each
other in other markets. 118 A firm in Conglomerate A (A1) may be less keen
to compete rigorously with a firm in Conglomerate B (B1) because another
firm in Conglomerate A (A2) supplies to another firm in Conglomerate B
(B2), and B2 is an important customer of A2. A1 will take into account the
ramifications for A2 when deciding how hard to compete with B1. A
variation of this is if instead of A2 relying on B2’s business, B2 relies on A2
to supply an important input. B1 may then hesitate to compete rigorously
with A1 for fear of jeopardizing B2’s supply of input. In fact, it has been
argued that, in the extreme case, A1 or B1 may withdraw from the market at
issue, or if entry has not taken place, may refrain from market entry for fear
of offending an important customer or supplier. 119
The supply relationship can also be used as a punitive mechanism to
police a cartel in another market. A2 can threaten to cut off supply to B2 in
order to induce B1 to abide by the cartel agreement. Whether this is likely to
materialize will depend on the relative importance of the various markets to
the conglomerates. If the sale by A2 to B2 is so large that Conglomerate A
cannot afford to lose it, then the threat to cut off supply to discipline B2
would not be credible. However, in that case, the threat to stop the purchase
by B2 to discipline A1 would bite. Likewise, the threat to cut off supply
would lack credibility if B2 can replace the supply easily, meaning that the
input market for B2 is competitive.
117

Id. at 9.
Weiss, supra note 7, at 435.
119 Id.
118
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Another variation of the above scenario is where different
conglomerates are competitors with each other in various markets, some are
strong in some markets but weak in others. In that case, a conglomerate may
hesitate to push its advantages in the market in which it is strong for fear that
it will be hit hard in the market in which it is weak. 120 The leverage here is
not a supply relationship, but a conglomerate’s relative weakness in a market.
While the conglomerates stop short of outright colluding with each other,
their mutual forbearance may deprive the markets of competitive vigor.
Bernheim and Whinston go further and argue that “when firms differ in their
costs across markets, multimarket contact can facilitate the maintenance of
collusive prices through the development of spheres of influence.” 121 In such
circumstances, the firms will develop spheres of influence and take over the
entire market in which they are more efficient while sustaining collusive
supracompetitive prices in their markets. 122 They further argue that the
creation of spheres of influence facilitates collusion by raising profit on the
equilibrium path and reducing the possible gains from defection. 123
There are probably other variations or permutations of the mutual
forbearance scenarios described above. The central idea is that when
conglomerates interact in multiple markets, their competitive decisions are
no longer made within the context of the immediate market. These decisions
take into account other markets in which the conglomerates operate, and the
interactions in other markets may be used as leverage to restrain competition
in the first market. Obviously, the more diversified are the conglomerates,
the more likely that this will happen.124 It is possible that the number of
markets in which conglomerates operate in an economy becomes so large
that they come to accept a situation of live-and-let-live and an unspoken truce
applies to all the sectors.
Despite the intuitive appeal of the above theories, the empirical
evidence thus far has not provided strong support for mutual
interdependence. Based on student experiments involving conglomerate
markets, Phillips and Mason conclude that conglomeration does not lead to
increased cooperation across the board, observing that “what was cooperative
becomes more competitive, and what was competitive becomes more
cooperative.” 125 Country-specific observations yield mixed results.
Weinstein and Yafeh find that Japanese keiretsus competed vigorously rather
120

Id. at 436.
Bernheim & Whinston, supra note 114, at 14.
122 Id. at 12–13.
123 Id. at 13.
124 Weiss, supra note 7, at 436.
125 Owen R. Phillips & Charles F. Mason, Mutual Forbearance in Experimental Conglomerate
Markets, 23 RAND J. ECON. 395, 405 (1992).
121
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than colluded with each other in the 1980s. 126 However, Kurgan-van
Hentenryk argues that the Belgian business groups facilitated the
cartelization of the Belgian coal industry between the two world wars.127
2. Parallel Exclusion
Parallel exclusion is a relatively new concept in competition law. It was
put forward by Hemphill and Wu in 2013. 128 They define parallel exclusion
as “self-entrenching conduct, engaged in by multiple firms, that harms
competition by limiting the competitive prospects of an existing or potential
rival to the excluding firms.” 129 The key distinguishing feature of parallel
exclusion is the lack of a horizontal agreement among the perpetrating
firms. 130 There may be a degree of interdependence among the firms, as in
the case of consciously parallel pricing, or the firms may be acting
completely independently, albeit in a parallel fashion. 131 Parallel exclusion is
anticompetitive because it can be closely linked to price increases and can
slow or block product innovation. 132 They identify six mechanisms of
exclusion: (1) simple exclusion, (2) recruiting agents, (3) overbuying an
input, (4) tying, (5) resale price maintenance, and (6) most favored nations
clauses (MFN). 133
Hemphill and Wu describe simple exclusion as where “the excluders act
on their own, without enlisting assistance from other parties, to raise the costs
of market entry. . . . Though the methods vary, their shared features are that
the excluder does not need to contract with others to succeed and that the
costs of exclusion are relatively low.” 134 Recruiting agents refers to when the
excluders enlist the help of third parties to help effectuate exclusion along
the supply chain. 135 Overbuying an input excludes potential entrants by

126 David E. Weinstein & Yishay Yafeh, Japan’s Corporate Groups: Collusive or Competitive? An
Empirical Investigation of Keiretsu Behavior, 43 J. IND. ECON. 359, 359 (1995).
127 Ginette Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, Structure and Strategy of Belgian Business Groups (1920-1990),
in BEYOND THE FIRM: BUSINESS GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 88 (T. Shiba
& M. Shimotani eds., 1997).
128 See C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182 (2013).
129 Id. at 1189.
130 Id. at 1190.
131 Id. at 1196.
132 Id. at 1210.
133 Id. at 1201–09.
134 Id. at 1201. An example they give is excluding rivals through the standard-setting process.
135 Id. This second method of exclusion could be costly for the excluders because the agents will need
to be compensated or threatened by the excluders for lost profit or opportunities forgone by virtue of
taking part in the exclusionary scheme. However, such a scheme need not be costly if “there are multiple
agents and no single agent bears the full cost of exclusion.” Id. at 1203.
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depriving them of access to a crucial input. 136 When parallel exclusion is
undertaken through tying, the market at which the exclusion is aimed is
usually the tied product market, and not the tying product market. Parallel
resale price maintenance achieves exclusion by providing multiple
downstream retailers an attractive profit margin, and hence a strong
economic incentive to act in the interests of the upstream manufacturers,
including to exclude potential entrants in the upstream market. 137 Finally,
MFN clauses achieve exclusion by making it difficult for a new entrant buyer
to secure cheaper sources of supply because extending a low price to one
buyer would entail discounts to all downstream buyers, which an upstream
seller may be reluctant to do. 138
The existence of conglomerates is conducive to parallel exclusion in a
number of ways. The first is the incentives of a prisoner’s dilemma created
by parallel exclusion. Hemphill and Wu highlight two reasons for deviation
in a parallel exclusionary scheme: the impulse to accommodate an entrant
and shirking. 139 One member of the exclusionary scheme may be tempted to
defect if it is paid off by the entrant. Shirking will be an issue if the
exclusionary conduct is costly and the benefit redounds to every other
member of the scheme while the costs are borne by one member alone. As
Hemphill and Wu note, under these circumstances the dominant strategy in
a one-period game would be to defect. 140 But if this game is repeated, it will
become a coordination game. For conglomerates, they may be playing this
game in multiple markets at the same time. Therefore, not only is the game
repeated over time, it is also repeated across markets. They will hence have
extra incentives to cooperate with each other.
The second is by deterring powerful outsiders from disrupting the
exclusionary scheme. A powerful outsider can undermine the stability of
such a scheme by dictating terms that disrupt the existing parallel practice or
by playing one oligopolist against another. 141 In an economy dominated by
conglomerates, the source of such a powerful outsider would be limited if
most of the large players in the economy belong to one of the corporate
groups. Members of a conglomerate obviously have no incentives to serve as
the powerful outsider to disrupt the parallel practice. Even if such a firm
exists, it may be less willing to challenge the existing parallel practice if the
firm is somehow dependent on members of some of the conglomerates in the
supply of input, distribution, or other aspects of its operation. Or such a firm
136

Id.
Id. at 1206–07.
138 Id. at 1209.
139 Id. at 1220–21.
140 Id. at 1221.
141 Id. at 1225.
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may simply be deterred by a desire not to mess with the powerful economic
interests represented by the conglomerates, regardless of any actual
commercial dependence. The minimization of challenge by a powerful
outsider means that parallel exclusionary schemes among conglomerate
companies are more likely to remain stable.
The third way in which the existence of conglomerates is conducive to
parallel exclusion is by making what Hemphill and Wu call recidivist
exclusion more likely. According to them, parallel exclusionary schemes
often may not be the result of deliberate planning but instead follow from the
maintenance of customary practice. 142 To the extent that the exclusionary
pattern can be replicated across industries, the habit to follow it in one
industry may spread to another industry. To the extent that parallel exclusion
creates competitive harm, the prevalence of conglomerates would exacerbate
the problem by rendering exclusionary schemes more likely to arise and to
remain stable.
3. Interlocking Directorate
This third type of multifirm conduct is not anticompetitive in itself, but
it gives rise to the potential for collusion or coordination by way of exchange
of competitively sensitive information through the common director. The
idea is that if the same person sits on the board of directors of two
competitors, he or she may act as a conduit of information, deliberately or
inadvertently, between the two firms, which will then use the information to
coordinate their market behavior. Given that it would be incredibly onerous
to monitor the flow of information through this common director on a daily
basis, the more feasible alternative is to ban the same person from sitting on
the boards of directors of two competitors altogether.
Interlocking directorate is by no means confined to conglomerates.
Stand-alone companies can share common directors as well. Interlocking
directorate, however, has greater potential for harm because of the wide range
of business of a conglomerate. Especially if the common director sits on a
high level of the ownership chain within two conglomerates, it is possible for
this common director to have a coordinative effect over a vast number of
markets. Competitive harm will be much more widespread than if
interlocking directorate happens between two stand-alone firms.
B. Unilateral Conduct
Apart from conduct involving coordination or collusion among
142
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conglomerates operating in multiple markets, conglomerates are also prone
to distort competition through unilateral conduct. In particular, the financial
resources at the disposal of conglomerates mean that conglomerates are
better able to withstand the loss that occurs during the predation period of
predatory pricing. Conglomerates also stand to gain from the reputational
effect of predatory pricing. There is bound to be spillover effect to other
markets once the conglomerate establishes its reputation as a fierce
competitor. Its competitors in other markets may hesitate to compete too
aggressively for fear of triggering retaliation by the conglomerate.
Conglomerates stand to gain from tying and other forms of leveraging of
market power due to their multimarket operation. There are also reasons to
believe that conglomerates will be able to take advantage of its heft and
perhaps the reliance of their transactional counterparties in multiple markets
to exploit these counterparties. Such exploitative practices are regulated as
unfair trade practices in some jurisdictions. Conglomerates may also deter
entry by their sheer size and may cross-subsidize their subsidiaries, thereby
distorting competition in a specific market. Lastly, conglomerates may also
lead to a loss of potential competition.
1. Predatory Pricing
Conglomerates enjoy two advantages in pursuing predatory pricing.
First, because conglomerates operate in multiple markets, they stand to
benefit by establishing reputations as fierce competitors that will meet
competitive entries with cut-throat price-cutting in multiple markets.
Therefore, they have greater incentive to pursue predatory pricing. Second,
because of their deeper pockets, conglomerates are better able to withstand
losses incurred during the predation period and therefore have greater ability
to execute a successful predatory pricing scheme. And when competitors
appreciate that, they will deem predatory pricing by conglomerates a more
likely response to competitor entry and will be more deterred from attempting
such an entry. This feeds back to the reputational effect scenario such that
conglomerates may not even need to undertake actual predation to build that
reputation. 143
The importance of reputational effect in predatory pricing has been
widely noted. 144 Kreps and Wilson demonstrate that reputation effect helps a
143 Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY
280, 304 (1982).
144 ORG.
ECON.
COOPERATION
DEV.,
PREDATORY
PRICING
7
(1989),
http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/2375661.pdf; Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H.
Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategy Theory and Legal Policy, 75–80 (TILBURG MICROECONOMICS
CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER VOL. 1999-82, 1999), https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/533021/82.pdf.
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monopolist to deter a future stream of potential entrants once it has
manifested its willingness to engage in predation strategy with an early
entrant. 145 No less an authority than F.M. Scherer has alluded to the
possibility that this reputation effect applies to a conglomerate across
multiple markets. He refers to:
the demonstration effect that sharp price cutting in one market can
have on the behavior of actual or would-be rivals in other markets. If
rivals come to fear from a multimarket seller’s actions in Market A
that entry or expansion in Markets B and C will be met by sharp price
cuts or other rapacious responses, they may be deterred from taking
aggressive actions there. Then the conglomerate’s expected benefit
from predation in Market A will be supplemented by the discounted
present value of the competition-inhibiting effects its example has in
Markets B and C. 146

Milgrom and Robert show that in the presence of information asymmetry, it
pays for the monopolist to pursue predation to deter an early entrant to
acquire the reputation of being a fierce competitor. 147 Information asymmetry
is important because when firms are not completely sure about each other’s
action, reputation, which may help to predict future behavior, matters. 148 This
reputation not only deters entry in the market in which predation is pursued,
it will do so in other markets as well. These markets need not be related. 149
Milgrom and Roberts note that “the value of a reputation and the extent of
reputation building increase with the frequency of the opportunities for its
use.” 150 This is particularly relevant to conglomerates because it means that
the more diversified a conglomerate is, the more valuable it would be for the
conglomerate to build a predatory reputation. This makes intuitive sense
because the more markets in which a conglomerate operates, the greater is
the payoff to the predation strategy, and the more likely it is that the
conglomerate will recoup its loss. Importantly, the reputational effect need
not even be that strong to deter entry. 151 Therefore, conglomerates would
have an overriding incentive to cultivate a fearsome reputation to deter
potential rivals.
Conglomerates are also better able to undertake predation strategies.
145 David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY
253 (1982).
146 FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 338
(2d ed. 1980).
147 Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 143, at 302.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 285.
150 Id. at 304.
151 Kreps & Wilson, supra note 145, at 262.

66

CHENG (DO NOT DELETE)

3/6/2017 6:21 PM

Conglomerate Dominance in Small and Emerging Economies
37:35 (2017)

Conglomerates have access to greater financial resources than stand-alone
firms to withstand the loss that is sustained during the predation period. This
corresponds with the deep pocket theory of predation.152 Moreover, as the
benefit of predation is no longer limited to market in which it is practiced,
the conglomerate will weigh the benefits across all markets against the loss
to determine whether it would be rational to pursue predation.
The deep pocket argument has been criticized for ignoring the
possibility that the entrant can turn to the capital markets to finance itself
when it withstands the onslaught of predation. 153 Therefore, more
sophisticated versions of the deep pocket model focus on the interaction
between the entrant and the financial markets. For instance, Poitevin
illustrates that because of capital market imperfections and a relative
familiarity of the capital market with the incumbent but not the entrant, the
entrant will be forced to take on debts to signal its quality to the capital
market. Such action renders the entrant susceptible to predation. 154
Furthermore, Bolton, Brodley, and Riordan assert that five conditions need
to be met for financial predation to succeed: (1) the target requires external
financing, (2) the target’s external financing depends on its initial
performance, (3) predation will be harmful enough that it threatens the
target’s continual viability, (4) the predator understands the target’s reliance
on external financing, and (5) the predator can finance predation internally
or has substantially better access to external credit than the target.155 This
extra gloss of financial market imperfection notwithstanding, ultimately what
matters is that the predator has greater financial resources to withstand the
loss. Conglomerates have greater availability of internal funding and better
access to external domestic funding. Conglomerates also have better access
to the international capital markets. Overall, the financial advantage of a
conglomerate over a stand-alone firm would be substantial.
Three comments are in order. First, all this discussion about the relative
strength of a conglomerate predator versus its target only holds true if the
target is not a stand-alone firm of a substantial size. If the target was another
conglomerate company, the financial advantage would depend on the relative
financial strength of the two conglomerates. But the decisive financial
advantage would be lost and one can no longer be as confident about the
152

See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, New Theories of Predatory Pricing, in INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE

IN NEW INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 112, 118–23 (Giacomo Bonanno and Dario Brandolini eds., 1990); Jean-

Pierre Benoit, Financially Constrained Entry in a Game with Incomplete Information, 15 RAND J. ECON.
490 (1984).
153 Bolton et al., supra note 144, at 53–54.
154 Michel Poitevin, Financial Signalling and the “Deep Pocket” Argument, 20 RAND J. ECON. 26,
26 (1989).
155 Bolton et al., supra note 144, at 60–62.
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predator’s likelihood of success. Even if the target was a stand-alone firm, it
need not be small. The national telephone monopolist may operate in only
one industry, but it is likely to dwarf many firms in the economy. Second,
the deep pocket theory of predation is premised on imperfections in the
capital markets. Given that capital markets in developing countries are often
less sophisticated, market imperfections abound, which means predation
strategies are more likely to succeed. 156 Finally, if predatory pricing is being
used as a parallel exclusion strategy, it will need to be pursued.
2. Tying
Tying and other forms of leveraging of market power require the
practicing firm to operate in multiple markets, often of related products, such
as complements. Obviously, conglomerates are not the only ones that offer
multiple products. A stand-alone firm can also offer complementary or
related products. Yet it remains true that the wide scope of a conglomerate’s
operations means that it is bound to have a wider range of product offering
than a stand-alone firm. The wide product range presents greater
opportunities for tying or other forms of leveraging of market power.
Although the relationship between conglomerates and tying does not
seem to have been deeply explored in the academic literature, the possibility
for tying offered by conglomerate operation is well recognized under EU
competition law. The 2008 EU Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines contain a
detailed discussion of how a conglomerate merger will give rise to tying
concerns. 157 In the Guidelines, the European Commission focuses on ability
to foreclose, incentives to foreclose, and competitive impact. This
relationship was further explored in detail in a number of cases, such as
Commission v. Tetra Laval 158 and General Electric v. Commission. 159
Although the courts’ focuses were on issues more specific to the merger
review context, such as the likelihood of the alleged conduct postmerger and

156 Finally, it should be noted that the above referenced theories of predatory pricing fall under the
rubric of the Strategic Theory, which incorporates game theory in the analysis. Many of these Strategic
Theory models manage to show competitive harm from predation strategies. However, their conclusion
is highly sensitive to their assumptions (though to a lesser extent true for the reputational effect models)
and would no longer be valid if the real-world situation deviates from the specifications in the model. For
a critique of these game-theoretic models of predatory pricing, see Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills,
Predatory Pricing and Strategic Theory, 89 GEO. L.J. 2475 (2001).
157 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the
control of concentrations between undertakings, 2008 O.J. (C 265) 6, paras. 93–118, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:265:0006:
0025:en:PDF.
158 Case C-12/03 P, Comm’n v. Tetra Laval, 2005 E.C.R. I-987.
159 Case T-210/01, Gen. Elec. v. Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-5575.
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whether the fact that the alleged conduct can be prosecuted after the fact
obviates the need for intervention at the merger review stage, the thrust of
the cases was a recognition that expansion of a conglomerate’s product scope
will create more opportunities for tying.
In fact, some older U.S. cases have recognized another form of
leveraging of market power, reciprocity, as a possible theory of harm in
conglomerate mergers. 160 Reciprocity refers to a situation where Firm A is a
buyer of Firm B which in turns sells to another division of Firm A.
Reciprocity could be anticompetitive if the Firm A withholds purchases from
Firm B unless Firm B also purchases from Firm A. Although it is not entirely
clear whether reciprocity remains a viable theory of harm in conglomerate
merger cases (in fact, it is not clear whether conglomerate mergers still attract
any antitrust scrutiny in the U.S.), these old cases remain relevant in their
recognition of the possibility of leveraging of market power in the
conglomerate context.
3. Exploitative Practices by Conglomerate Companies
Conglomerate companies sometimes make use of their market power or
bargaining power to exploit contractual counterparties. 161 If a contractual
counterparty relies on businesses with a number of conglomerate companies,
these companies can pool together their bargaining power to extract better
bargaining terms from the counterparty. In fact, these companies may push
the bargain so hard that the contractual terms become exploitative. Such
exploitation of contractual counterparties could be a regulatory concern. U.S.
antitrust law does not regulate exploitative practices. EU competition law
does, but mostly only in the realm of excessive pricing. 162 Beyond that EU
law has largely adopted a hands-off approach. The competition law or related
laws of a number of jurisdictions, such as France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and
Korea, however, do regulate such exploitative practices. In Germany and
France, the area of law is known as abuse of economic dependence or
dependency. 163 In Japan and Korea, it is called abuse of superior bargaining
160

E.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
It has been recognized that bargaining power can ultimately come from market power. See
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Lawrence S. Pope, Dethroning Lear? Incentives to Innovate After
MedImmune, 24 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 971, 987 (2009).
162 RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW 759–69 (8th ed. 2015).
163 See Mor Bakhoum, Abuse without Dominance in Competition: Abuse of Economic Dependence
and its Interface with Abuse of Dominance 8–9 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Academic Society for Competition Law), http://ascola-tokyo-conference-2015.meiji.jp/pdf/
ConferencePapers/General%20Session%202/Bakhoum_abuse%20of%20economic%20dependence%20
ASCOLA%202015%2013%205%202015.pdf; Florian Wagner-von Papp, Comparative Antitrust
Federalism and the Error-Cost Framework: Rhetoric and Reality: You Protect Competitors, We Protect
161
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position. 164 What follows is a brief exposition of the kind of exploitative
practices that have been addressed in South Korea, which has one of the most
severe problems with conglomerates, also known as chaebols.
Article 23 of the South Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade
Act (MRFTA) prohibits “trading by unjustly using a superior bargaining
position.” 165 The law enumerates five instances of abuse of superior
bargaining position, namely forced purchase, forced provision of benefit,
imposition of sales target, imposition of disadvantage, and interference with
business management and operations. Imposition of disadvantage is defined
as an “[a]ct of causing a disadvantage in the process of carrying out the trade,
setting or changing the trading condition to the disadvantage of the
counterpart using methods other than . . . forced purchase, forced provision
of benefit, and imposed sales target.” 166
In the Seoul City Gas case, the defendant forced the counterparty
customer service centers to purchase specific gifts for their employees, and
was found by the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) to have committed
a forced purchase. 167 In the LG Electronics case, the defendant required its
agent stores, which referred customers to the defendant, to be jointly liable
for nonpayment by the customers. The KFTC ruled that the conduct was an
unjust imposition of disadvantage because it unfairly passed on customer
default risk to the agent stores against the will of the stores, and because the
conduct deviated from the common practices in the industry. 168 The LG
Group is one of the major conglomerates in South Korea. 169 In the Hyundai
Department Store case, Hyundai compelled its suppliers to share the login
information on an information portal that would allow Hyundai to check the
sales records of its competitors in real-time. The KFTC ruled that the conduct

Competition—Except When We Protect Competitors, in WILLIAM E. KOVACIC: AN ANTITRUST TRIBUTE
LIBER AMICORUM—VOLUME II 23, 55 (Nicolas Charbit & Elisa Ramundo eds., 2014).
164 Thomas K. Cheng & Michal S. Gal, Superior Bargaining Power: Dealing with Aggregate
Concentration Concerns, in ABUSE OF DOMINANCE IN COMPETITION LAW (Paul Nihoul & Iwakazu
Takahashi eds., forthcoming) (on file with author).
165 Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Act No. 3320,1980, art. 23(1)4, (S. Kor.), translated in
Korea
Fair Trade Commission online database, http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=
getList&type_cd=62&pageId=0401.
166 Enforcement Decree of The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Table 1–2, translated in
Korea
Fair Trade Commission online database, http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=
getList&type_cd=62&pageId=0401.
167 Seouldo sigaseu(ju)ui geolaesangjiwinam-yonghaeng-wie daehan geon [Abuse of Superior
Bargaining Position by Seoul City Gas Co. Ltd.], Korea Fair Trade Commission, Case 2013-1622,
Resolution 2014-105, at paras. 51–62 (May 8, 2014) (S. Kor.) (translation on file with author).
168 Eljijeonja(ju) geolaesangjiwinam-yonghaeng-wie daehan geon [Abuse of Superior Bargaining
Position by LG Electronics Co. Ltd.], Korea Fair Trade Commission, Case 2011-2555, Resolution 2014069, at § 2.C.2).B) (Apr. 3, 2014) (S. Kor.) (translation on file with author).
169 See LG Corp, http://www.lgcorp.com/about/affiliatesList.dev (last visited Sept. 17, 2016).
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was an unfair interference with business operations because it would force
the suppliers to divulge accurate sales information of competing department
stores to Hyundai and would force suppliers to take part in costly and
ineffective sales promotion events to the detriment of the suppliers. 170
Hyundai is another leading conglomerate in the country.
Not only have the chaebols been regularly found to have abused their
superior bargaining position, the KFTC has also expressly linked the notion
of superior bargaining position to conglomerate membership. In the
Lotte.com case, the KFTC buttressed its conclusion of a superior bargaining
position on the grounds that the defendant was part of a conglomerate. In
finding that Lotte.com had a superior bargaining position, the KFTC
emphasized that it was one of the seventy-seven companies affiliated with
the Lotte Conglomerate. 171 The KFTC observed that “the suppliers’ business
activities, such as the expansion of their businesses and promotion of their
products, would be inevitably subject to the influence of their trades with the
defendant, who has connections with the powerful conglomerate.” 172
4. Entry Deterrence or Loss of Potential Competition
Conglomerates may deter entry into markets and cause loss of potential
competition. A number of mechanisms through which conglomerates may do
so have been delineated above, such as through parallel exclusion or building
a predatory reputation. It has been noted that conglomerates may deter entry
without any overt action, simply by virtue of its vastness. Ayal notes that “in
order to challenge a business group with economic power, a competitor must
not only enter the relevant product markets, but also create a network of
contacts and input providers, well beyond the obvious production facilities
and marketing venues.” 173
It is, however, important not to overstate this problem. Regardless of
who one’s competitors are, entering a new market always entails building
new business connections, supplier networks, and distribution networks. It is
unlikely that the obstacles become greater simply because one’s competitors
are conglomerate companies. Conglomerate companies do not always
achieve greater entry deterrent effect. In fact, Cestone and Fumagalli show

170 Jusighoesa hyeondaebaeghwajeom-ui geolaesangjiwinam-yonghaeng-wie daehan geon [Abuse of
Superior Bargaining Position by Hyundai Department Store, Inc.], Korea Fair Trade Commission, Case
2008-1962, Resolution 2008-317, at § 2.C.(3)–(4) (Dec. 4, 2008) (S. Kor.) (translation on file with author).
171 (ju)losdedaskeom-ui geolaesangjiwinam-yonghaeng-wie daehan geon [Abuse of Superior
Bargaining Position by Lotte.com Co. Ltd.], Korea Fair Trade Commission, Case 2012-0591, Resolution
2014-037, at § 2.C.2).A) (Jan. 22, 2014) (S. Kor.) (translation on file with author).
172 Id.
173 Ayal, supra note 101, at 230.
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that internal markets do not always help conglomerate companies to deter
entry; under certain conditions, they may actually be softer than stand-alone
firms. 174 However, it is possible that it is harder to build essential business
connections when facing conglomerate competitors. This could be true if the
economy is so controlled by conglomerates that most of the supplier network
and distribution network are in the hands of conglomerates. There may be an
understanding among them to restrict access to these resources only to fellow
conglomerates. Or even if suppliers and distributors are independent, they
can be so reliant on business from conglomerates that they are susceptible to
conglomerate pressure to limit themselves to dealing with other
conglomerates.
That conglomerates, or to put it more precisely conglomerate mergers,
can result in loss of potential competition is undisputed. Loss of potential
competition as a theory of harm in conglomerate mergers is widely accepted.
Although conglomerate mergers have not been the enforcement focus of the
Agencies for quite some time, there remain a slew of U.S. Supreme Court
cases from decades ago that apply various potential competition theories to
conglomerate mergers. 175 The 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines
issued by the Department of Justice articulates the rationale for regulating
conglomerate mergers on potential competition grounds as follows:
In some circumstances, the non-horizontal merger of a firm already in
a market (the “acquired firm”) with a potential entrant to that market
(the “acquiring firm”) may adversely affect competition in the
market. . . . By eliminating a significant present competitive threat
that constrains the behavior of the firms already in the market, the
merger could result in an immediate deterioration in market
performance. . . . [Furthermore,] [b]y eliminating the possibility of
entry by the acquiring firm in a more procompetitive manner, the
merger could result in a lost opportunity for improvement in market
performance resulting from the addition of a significant competitor. 176

If loss of potential competition is a concern for conglomerate mergers, it can
be tackled relatively easily through merger review. It does not require direct
intervention on the structure or market behavior of conglomerates and merely
requires us to restrict their growth by acquisition under some circumstances.

174 Giacinta Cestone & Chiara Fumagalli, The Strategic Impact of Resource Flexibility in Business
Groups, 36 RAND J. ECON. 193, 207 (2005).
175 See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); United States v. Marine
Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
176 Dep’t of Justice 1984 Merger Guidelines, § 4.1, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,103 [hereinafter
1984 Merger Guidelines].
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5. Cross-Subsidization
Cross-subsidization refers to the subsidization of one line of business or
subsidiary by another line of business or subsidiary within a conglomerate.
Although it could be viewed in some sense as a strength in that conglomerate
companies are well supported financially, cross-subsidization could lead to
resource misallocation because one line of business within a conglomerate is
no longer responsible for its own profit and loss. The cross-transfer of funds
from one line of business to another allows an otherwise inefficient or lossmaking business to survive, resulting in inefficient use of resources. It also
results in distortion of competition because competitors within a market no
longer compete with the resources and profit they generate within that
market. Competition is distorted when a competitor that would have run out
of cash and been forced out of the market under normal circumstances is
artificially propped up by external funding. The market is saddled with an
inefficient producer supplying substandard output, which the market would
be better off without. Short of preventing the exit of an inefficient firm, crosssubsidization also gives conglomerate companies better ability to withstand
a short-term competitive threat in a market. 177 However, cross-subsidization
has also been said to be procompetitive by allowing a conglomerate company
to be a more effective entrant into a new market. 178
Cross-subsidization has often been studied from a corporate finance
perspective. The question posed is usually whether conglomerates lose value
by engaging in cross-subsidization. 179 Some commentators have found that
conglomerates do lose value by engaging in inefficient crosssubsidization. 180 From a competition perspective, cross-subsidization most
often arises as an issue in the regulated industries. For example, it has been
featured in a few European cases in which the postal service allegedly
subsidized its parcel delivery service, which is in competition with private
providers, with other sources of revenue or direct subsidies. 181 In addition,
cross-subsidization has been examined in the telecom sector 182 and electricity
177

ERIC A. SCHUTZ, MARKETS AND POWER: THE 21ST CENTURY COMMAND ECONOMY 79 (2001).
Id.
179 See Berger & Ofek, supra note 23, at 58; Margaret Meyer, Paul Milgrom & John Roberts,
Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes, 1 J. ECON. MGMT. STRATEGY 9
(1992); Iman van Lelyveld & Klaas Knot, Do financial conglomerates create or destroy value” Evidence
from the EU (DNB WORKING PAPER No. 174/2008, 2008), http://www.dnb.nl/binaries/
Working%20paper%20174_tcm46-175062.pdf.
180 Berger & Ofek, supra note 23 at 58; van Lelyveld & Knot, supra note 179, at 14.
181 Case C-39/94, SFEI v. La Poste, 1996 E.C.R. I-3547; Case C-399/08, P Comm’n v. Deutsche Post
AG, 2010 E.C.R. I-7862.
182 Steve G. Parsons, Cross-Subsidization in Telecommunications, 13 J. REG. ECON. 157 (1998);
Kenneth C. Baseman, Open Entry and Cross-Subsidization in Regulated Markets, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC
178
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sector. 183 Within competition law, the discussion of cross-subsidization often
arises in the context of predatory pricing. 184 It has been explored in the
context of below-cost pricing practiced by multiproduct firms in competitive
markets. 185 However, these multiproduct firms are not meant to refer to
conglomerates, but stand-alone firms, such as supermarkets, that sell multiple
products. Simple cross-subsidization of a line of business (within a
conglomerate or not) absent predatory pricing outside of the regulated
industry context has not been treated as a stand-alone violation of
competition. Yet commentators have noted the distortionary effect of crosssubsidization in this context. Walter and Brock observe that crosssubsidization means that “the large conglomerate’s market ‘success’ may be
due primarily to its ‘deep pocket’ rather than superior efficiency or
innovativeness.” 186 South Korea is one of few jurisdictions that place
restrictions on intragroup transactions in its competition law, which will be
discussed in greater detail below.
V. POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO CONGLOMERATE DOMINANCE
A number of responses are possible to the problems described above.
Some of these problems are inherent in the size and internal operations of
conglomerates. It would be very difficult to alleviate these concerns through
regulations of their market behavior. There will need to be direct restrictions
on their growth and internal operations. Japan and Korea have been at the
forefront of such direct regulation of conglomerates. The discussion below
will borrow heavily from their experiences. In deciding whether to adopt
such restrictions, there needs to be a careful holistic assessment of the net
benefits of conglomerates to the local economy. 187 The effectiveness of these
measures also needs to be considered. The consensus in Korea, which is the
REGULATION 329 (Gary Fromm, ed., 1981).
183 SALLY HUNT, MAKING COMPETITION WORK IN ELECTRICITY 60 (2002).
184 Cyril Ritter, Does the Law of Predatory Pricing and Cross-Subsidization Need a Radical Rethink?,
27 World Competition 613 (2004); John Temple Lang & Robert O’Donoghue, Defining Legitimate
Competition: How to Clarify Pricing Abuses Under Article 82 EC, 26 Fordham Int’l L.J. 83 (2002);
Thomas W. Gilligan & Michael L. Smirlock, Predation and Cross-Subsidization in the Value Maximizing
Multiproduct Firm, 50 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 37 (1983).
185 Zhijun Chen & Patrick Rey, Competitive Cross-Subsidization (Toulouse School of Econ., Working
Paper No. IDEI-808, 2013), http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/2013/wp_idei_808.pdf.
186 WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX: INDUSTRY, LABOR, AND
GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 176 (2d ed. 2004).
187 In fact, one may argue that not all of the advantages of conglomerates should count toward the
determination of their net social benefits. Many of these advantages, such as sharing of goodwill and
economies of scale and scope, accrue to the firm, and do not necessarily benefit society in general. One
may argue that these advantages should not be given credit unless there is evidence that they are passed
onto consumers or otherwise shared with society at large.
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jurisdiction that has most actively applied direct regulation of conglomerates
in recent years, is that these measures have not been successful in reining in
conglomerates in the country. 188 Although this does not mean that these
measures may not work in other jurisdictions. Finally, even if it is decided
that these restrictions should be adopted, one should make sure that there is
sufficient political will to adopt and enforce them.
Some other problems delineated above concern the market behavior of
conglomerates. Most of them fall within the usual ambit of conventional
competition law. The only anomaly is abuse of superior bargaining position,
which is regulated as unfair trade practices.
A. Direct Regulation of Conglomerates and Their Internal
Operations
1. Direct Restrictions on the Growth of Conglomerates
Japan is rather unique in that it imposes direct restrictions on the size of
conglomerates under its competition law. There are specific provisions that
target what is known as excessive concentration of economic power. Article
9(1) of the Anti-Monopoly Act (AMA) states that “[n]o company may be
established that would cause an excessive concentration of economic power
due to share holding (including equity interest; the same applies hereinafter)
in other companies in Japan . . . .” 189 Article 9(3) proceeds to define an
excessive concentration of economic power as follows:
the overall business scale of a company, its subsidiary companies, and
other domestic companies whose business activities it controls
through shareholding, is extremely large across a considerable number
of business fields; that a company, its subsidiary companies, and other
domestic companies it controls have a great amount of power to
influence other enterprises through transactions with their funds; or
that a company, its subsidiary companies, and other domestic
companies it controls occupy influential positions in a considerable
number of interrelated fields of business; and that any of these factors
have a large effect on the national economy and impede fair and free
competition from moving forward. 190

The Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) has issued the Guidelines
188 Jeong-Pyo Choi & Dennis Patterson, Conglomerate Regulation and Aggregate Concentration in
Korea: An Empirical Analysis, 12 J. OF ASIA PACIFIC ECON. 250, 259–68 (2007) (arguing that the various
measures adopted in the MRFTA have had minimal impact on aggregate concentration in South Korea).
189 Antimonopoly Act, Act No. 54 of 1947, art. 9(1), http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_gls/
amended_ama09 (Japan).
190 Id. art. 9(3).
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Concerning Companies which Constitute an Excessive Concentration of
Economic Power to provide a more precise definition of excessive
concentration of economic power. According to these Guidelines, excessive
concentration of economic power refers to three scenarios: (1) a corporate
group which has “business activities whose overall scale is exceptionally
large and covers a substantial number of principle [sic] fields of business” 191;
(2) a corporate group which wields “a high degree of influence over other
companies derived from trades involving funds” 192; and (3) a corporate group
which “occupies a substantial position in each of a substantial number of
principle [sic] fields that are interrelated.” 193 These three scenarios would
only constitute excessive concentration of economic power if the corporate
group exerts “big influence over the national economy” 194 and “obstructs
enhancement of fair and free competition.” 195
The Guidelines further interpret these three scenarios as respectively
referring to “[a] company group . . . of large scale and has large-scale
enterprises in each of a substantial number of principal fields of business
[headings omitted]” 196; “[a] company which owns both a large-scale
financial company and a large-scale company except a company engaged
either in financial business or in a line of business closely related thereto
[headings omitted]” 197; and “[a] company which owns substantial number of
companies each of which possesses a substantial position over a principal
field of business, [and] the said fields of business being interrelated but
different for each company [headings omitted].” 198 A company group is of
large scale if it has total assets of over 15 trillion yen. 199 A large-scale
financial company is one with total assets over 15 trillion yen. A large-scale
enterprise or company is one with total assets of over 300 billion yen. 200 A
company possesses a substantial position if it accounts for no less than 10%
of the total sales in the field of business. 201 A substantial number refers to
five or more. 202 A principal field of business is “a type of industry which is

191 Guidelines Concerning Companies Which Constitute an Excessive Concentration of Economic
Power,
2002,
art.
2(1),
http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_gls/imonopoly_guidelines.files/
Company_Concentration.pdf (Japan).
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id. art. 2(2).
197 Id. art. 2(3).
198 Id. art. 2(4).
199 Id. art. 2(2).
200 Id.
201 Id. art. 2(4).
202 Id. art. 2(2).
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included in the three-digit classifications of Japan Standard Industrial
Classification and in which shipment volume exceeds six hundred billion
JPY.” 203 Lastly, the degree of interrelatedness “shall be examined with
reference to the degree of actual trade dependency among different fields of
business and the circumstances of user choice.” 204 In particular, fields of
business are interrelated if they share trade relationships or complement or
substitute relationships. 205 By way of example, the JFTC explains that
electric power and oil refining are interrelated fields of business, as are
banking, securities, life insurance, and the credit card industry. 206
The Guidelines seem to adopt a prescriptive, mechanical approach to
the prohibition. If a corporate group falls within any of the three enumerated
scenarios, it violates Article 9 of the AMA. The Guidelines do not mandate
a separate consideration of whether the group wields big influence over the
national economy and whether the group obstructs the enhancement of fair
and free competition. Under these Guidelines, the JFTC has little discretion
over the designation of excessive concentration of economic power. 207 It is
not clear how strictly enforced these highly prescriptive rules on excessive
concentration of economic power are today.
2. Direct Restrictions on Intragroup Transactions
Most competition laws do not directly regulate cross-subsidization
within conglomerates as such. The MRFTA in South Korea, however, does
impose limitations on the ability of conglomerate companies to give
assistance to each other, such as in the form of debt guarantees. This was
believed to be a serious issue as it allowed chaebol companies to be
excessively leveraged. The first version of the restriction came about in the
1992 amendment, which restricted affiliate debt “guarantees to 200% of the
[guaranteeing] subsidiaries’ net assets . . . .” 208 In the 1996 amendment, the
cap was lowered to 100% of the guaranteeing subsidiary’s net assets. 209
203

Id. art. 2(4).
Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. List 2.
207 Toshiaki Takigawa, Competition law and policy of Japan, 54 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 435, 497
(2009). The provisions regulating economic concentration were introduced in the original AMA to prevent
the reemergence of zaibatsu after Japan’s defeat in the Second World War. Id. at 496. However, the issue
of economic concentration has gradually lost its urgency during the post-War years and the Japanese
parliament, known as the Diet, and the Japan Fair Trade Commission gradually loosened the scope of
regulation of economic concentration. For example, the prohibition of pure holding companies, which had
formed the bedrock of regulation of economic concentration was lifted in the 1997 AMA amendment. Id.
208 Kyu Uck Lee, Economic Development and Competition Policy in Korea, 1 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUD. L. REV. 67, 70 (2002).
209 Id.
204
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Finally, in the 1998 amendment, which remains effective to this day in the
form of Article 10-2, all kinds of intragroup debt guarantees by affiliated
companies are prohibited altogether. 210 It was said that prior to the
introduction of this restriction, “chaebols had easy access to banks because
the chaebol subsidiaries would have other affiliates guarantee the chaebols’
debts under the collateral-based loan system—it is very difficult in Korea to
obtain credit without collateral—thus disproportionately favoring the
chaebols and fueling their rapid expansion.” 211 Therefore, aside from
preventing cross-subsidization within conglomerates, this provision also
helps to correct the distortions in the domestic financial markets resulting
from the oversized presence of conglomerates.
Somewhat related to the issue of intragroup assistance within a
conglomerate is cross-shareholding among conglomerate companies.
Although it is mainly seen as a corporate governance issue, by injecting
equity capital into an affiliate, a conglomerate company is indirectly
subsidizing the affiliate’s operations. Article 9 of the MRFTA provides that
a “company belonging to [a designated business] group . . . shall not acquire
or own stocks of an affiliated company which . . . owns [that first company’s]
stock.” 212 Affiliated companies are defined in Article 2 as companies
belonging to the same designated business group. 213
B. Regulation of Market Behavior
1. Mutual Interdependence
Mutual interdependence essentially results in or facilitates three types
of harmful situations: express collusion, tacit collusion, and mutual
forbearance in competitive effort. For express collusion, the solution is
relatively straightforward. Cartels are uniformly condemned under
competition laws across the globe. What needs to be done is that competition
authorities need to be vigilant in markets in which the likelihood of collusion
is augmented by mutual interdependence. For tacit collusion, given that it is
generally legal, there is probably not much that competition law can do to
directly tackle the problem. The same applies to mutual forbearance. If the
leverage comes from a sales relationship or supply of important input,
presumably, the competition authority can attempt to remove the leverage by
210 Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Act No. 3320,1980, arts. 10–2, (S. Kor.), translated in
Korea
Fair Trade Commission online database, http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=
getList&type_cd=62&pageId=0401.
211 Lee, supra note 208, at 70.
212 Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, art. 9.
213 Id. art. 2.
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ordering the severance of the sales or supply relationship. This, however,
would amount to an excessive intrusion of commercial freedom as a currently
beneficial business relationship is being sacrificed for possible reduction in
competitive effort. Unless the competition authority can prove actual and
palpable reduction in competitive effort, such a prohibition would be illjustified. And if the leverage comes from relative weakness in particular
markets, there would be nothing that the competition authority can do to
remedy that. It would seem that for cases of tacit collusion and mutual
forbearance, the greatest hope is to rely on merger review to prevent the
emergence of situations of mutual interdependence in the first place. This
will be discussed in greater detail in the merger review part.
2. Parallel Exclusion
As mentioned earlier, parallel exclusion has not been expressly
recognized as conduct actionable under competition law in the United States
or elsewhere. However, as Hemphill and Wu suggest, it is possible to
accommodate it under existing U.S. antitrust doctrines such as shared
monopoly or conspiracy to monopolize under § 2 of the Sherman Act, or the
aggregation doctrine under § 1. 214 They also suggest invoking § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission and prosecuting parallel exclusion as an unfair
method of competition. 215 Likewise, under EU competition law, it may be
possible to fit parallel exclusion under the doctrine of collective dominance
under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU). 216 An alternative would be to pursue it under Article 101 of the
TFEU, which, unlike § 1 of the Sherman Act, does not require an
agreement. 217 A concerted practice will also sustain an infringement of
Article 101. The notion of concerted practice has been used to tackle parallel
conduct in oligopolistic markets in the past, 218 and it is possible it can be used
to cover parallel exclusion. Therefore, on both sides of the Atlantic, there are
possibilities to use competition law to tackle parallel exclusion.
3. Predatory Pricing
Competition law, of course, regulates predatory pricing. Under U.S.
antitrust law, a plaintiff, in order to prevail in a predatory pricing claim, must
show that the defendant monopolist has priced its product below a certain
214

Hemphill & Wu, supra note 128, at 1236–43, 1245–48.
Id. at 1243–45.
216 Id. at 1239 n.237.
217 WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 162, at 103–120.
218 Id. at 603–05.
215
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measure of cost and there is a dangerous probability of recoupment of the
loss sustained during the predation period. 219 Under EU competition law,
there is no need to prove recoupment. Instead, the applicable rule changes
according to the level of the price. If the price is above average total cost,
then the price cutting is presumptively legal.220 If the price is below average
variable cost, there is a rebuttable presumption that it has committed
predatory pricing. 221 If the price is between average total cost and average
variable cost, the defendant would be guilty of predation if the price cutting
is part of a plan to eliminate a competitor. 222 While the consensus in the
United States seems to be that the requirement of a showing of probable
recoupment is sound, Leslie has recently argued against this requirement,
more in line with EU law. 223 This article will not attempt to resolve this
highly intricate debate. Suffice it to say for now that if below-cost price
cutting by conglomerate companies seems frequent enough in a particular
jurisdiction, there may be a good argument for abolishing the recoupment
requirement, which is widely believed to have rendered the predatory pricing
claim unwinnable under U.S. law. 224 This is especially true when there is
evidence that the target has impaired access to the capital market, which
means it has reduced ability to withstand predation, which in turn means that
there is a smaller loss for the predator to recoup.
If the requirement is to be kept, then it needs to be adjusted to allow for
a showing of multimarket recoupment. Not allowing for this would overstate
the difficulty of recoupment for conglomerate companies and result in false
negatives. However, one needs to be mindful of the complexity of this proof
of multimarket recoupment. The recoupment that takes place in other
markets will not be in the form of a price increase after a rival has exited the
market. It will be the premium that the conglomerate can charge in light of
deterred market entry. This would require the courts to identify who the likely
entrants are and estimate how far the price would have dropped if they had
entered. And this would have to be done for multiple markets. This would
probably be beyond the capability of most courts.

219
220

Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 210 (1993).
See Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 1991 E.C.R. I-3359, ¶

91.
221

See id. ¶ 72.
Id. ¶ 71.
223 Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695, 1698–1700
(2013).
224 Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (2005).
222
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4. Tying
Competition law is fully equipped to handle tying, which is within the
purview of both U.S. antitrust law and EU competition law. In fact, tying is
one of the few nonhorizontal conduct towards which both sides of the
Atlantic share a similarly hostile attitude.225 The leading case under U.S.
antitrust law is Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde. 226 In this
case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the qualified per se rule for tying, under
which the plaintiff, in order to prevail, must prove: (1) there are two distinct
products, (2) customers are coerced to purchase the two products together,
(3) the defendant possesses market power in the tying product market, and
(4) a not insubstantial amount of commerce in the tied product is affected. 227
In Europe, the case law by and large imposes the same requirements on a
tying or bundling claim. 228 One extra twist under EU law is that the defendant
is allowed to offer an objective justification for the tie, which, if accepted,
would exonerate the defendant. 229 Under the qualified per se rule in the
United States, no procompetitive justifications will be accepted.
5. Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position
As mentioned earlier, abuse of superior bargaining position is not within
the purview of conventional competition law. In both Japan and Korea it is
regulated as an unfair trade practice. In both jurisdictions, there is a set of
detailed guidelines and a body of decisional practice and case law that
explain the application of the provision. The KFTC Guidelines provide very
detailed guidance on how the provision is applied. 230 A full explanation of
the complex analytical framework is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice
it to note that under the provision, it is necessary both to prove a superior
bargaining position and the existence of an abuse, which should fall within
one of the five categories stipulated in the MRFTA.
The MRFTA provides that a superior bargaining position is to be
established in light of factors such as the “ease of securing a substitute party
for trade, level of income dependency in the relationship, control or
225 Perhaps one minor difference is that tying is almost exclusively treated as an abuse of dominance
under EU law, whereas it could be prosecuted under both Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
which usually means that Section 1 is invoked by virtue of its lower market power requirement.
226 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
227 Id.
228 WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 162, at 732–36.
229 Id. at 736.
230 Korea Fair Trade Commission, Guidelines for Assessment of Unfair Trade Practices, translated in
Korea
Fair Trade Commission online database, http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=
getList&type_cd=62&pageId=0401 [hereinafter KFTC Guidelines].
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supervision involved, and characteristics of goods or services traded.” 231 The
Guidelines further state that the fact that the counterparty had no choice but
to accept the abusive conduct, such as forced purchase demand, shows that
the undertaking has a superior bargaining position. Ease of securing a
substitute party for trade refers to “whether or not it is possible to find another
undertaking to trade with at a low transaction cost.” 232 The reference to low
transaction cost suggests that the standard is not high. What needs to be
proved is not absolute impossibility, but only that a replacement cannot be
found without incurring high transaction costs. The replacement will only be
deemed to be adequate if it does not result in reduction in trading volume or
does not present difficulties for the counterparty to recover its investments.233
In other words, the Guidelines make it quite easy to demonstrate a lack of
choice. 234 In KFTC’s decisional practices, it seems that the KFTC
emphasizes the following factors: the market in which the parties operate, the
gap between the parties’ business capacities and their scope of business
activities, and the characteristics of the product or service. 235 Lastly, the
KFTC’s decisional practice suggests that the KFTC pays much attention to
the defendant’s market power in the market to which the contract pertains.
The KFTC usually begins each decision with a very detailed analysis of the
relevant market and proceeds to enumerate the party’s market share.
Given the number of different conduct enumerated in the MRFTA, this
article will not examine the legal treatment of each type of abuses. Forced
purchase will be used as an example for illustration. The KFTC Guidelines
defines forced purchase as “an undertaking forcing its trading counter[party]
to purchase goods or services even though the counterparty has no intention
of doing so.” 236 The purchase must be made under coercion, which can be
proved by the existence of penalty for failure to purchase and other objective
facts suggesting that the counterparty was forced to make the purchase. The
Guidelines emphasize that the primary consideration in determining the
legality of forced purchase, like other prohibited abuses, is whether it
231 Id. § II.6.A.(2)(B). Similar criteria are used in other jurisdictions such as France. Bakhoum, supra
note 163, at 5–6.
232 KFTC Guidelines, supra note 230, § II.6.A.(2)(B).
233 Id.
234 This is similar to the situation in Italy where an undertaking is required to demonstrate that it is
unable to substitute its production or its contractual counterparty without incurring unreasonable costs.
See Valeria Falce, The Italian Regulation against the abuse of economic dependence, in ABUSE OF
DOMINANCE IN COMPETITION LAW (Paul Nihoul & Iwakazu Takahashi eds., forthcoming) (on file with
author). However, this is already a more stringent standard than France, where an economic dependent
situation can be said to exist if a contractual party cannot replace its counterparty on identical terms.
Bakhoum, supra note 163, at 10.
235 Cheng & Gal, supra note 164, at 305.
236 KFTC Guidelines, supra note 230, § II.6.A.(1)(A).
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“violates principles of fairness in trade.” Unfairness of the forced purchase
can be established in light of factors such as “the objective of the conduct,
likelihood of anticipation by the counterparty, . . . ordinary course of trade in
the industry, damage [] caused to the counterparty as a result of the forced
purchase, and relevant laws.” 237 On the likelihood of anticipation, the
Guidelines explain that if the forced purchase was “clearly predictable or if
the purchase is specified in the contract from the beginning, such forced
purchase shall not be considered unfair.” 238 This suggests that at least with
respect to forced purchase, the abuse of superior bargaining position only
applies to ex post contractual revisions, which substantially narrows its
scope.
Before concluding this discussion about abuse of superior bargaining
position, it should be noted that regulating unilateral exploitative practices
by a nondominant firm is highly controversial within competition law.
Wagner-von Papp argues that these provisions upset the careful balance that
has been struck to avoid false positives in the abuse of dominance
provisions. 239 Another recurrent problem in this area is the difficulty in
coming up with a rigorous definition of superior bargaining position.
Therefore, while it may be justified to extend the provisions to conglomerates
if a particular jurisdiction already has these provisions in place, it may not be
wise to adopt them solely for the purpose of regulating exploitative practices
by conglomerate companies. These provisions will be applied to many
scenarios beyond conglomerates that a jurisdiction may not want to regulate.
6. Entry Deterrence/Loss of Potential Competition
Entry deterrence on its own is not a competition law violation. It is only
the outcome or effect of particular conduct. How it is treated under
competition law depends on how it is achieved. If it is achieved by means of
parallel exclusion or the reputational effect of predation, it would be evidence
that the alleged conduct is exclusionary and therefore illegal. However, if the
entry deterrent effect is the result of the vastness of a conglomerate and the
need to replicate its business connections, as argued by Ayal, there would be
no remedy under competition law short of making being a conglomerate itself
a violation, which no jurisdiction does. An alternative would be measures to
limit the growth and size of conglomerates, which Korea and Japan have
adopted. This stops short of making being a conglomerate itself a violation,
but restricts conglomerates from becoming too big, hence reducing the
237

Id. § II.6.A.(2)(B).
Id.
239 Wagner-von Papp, supra note 163, at 60.
238
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probability that they would exert the undesired entry deterrent effect.
Meanwhile, regulating conglomerate mergers for potential competition
concerns is widely accepted in U.S. antitrust law. 240 A detailed discussion
about this will be reserved for the merger review part.
7. Interlocking Directorate
Interlocking directorate is regulating by § 8 of the Clayton Act. It
provides that “[n]o person shall, at the same time, serve as a director or
officer of any two corporations . . . that are . . . by virtue of their business and
location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by
agreements between them would constitute a violation of any of the antitrust
laws.” 241 The statute then provides a number of minor exemptions for small
corporations and insignificant competitive overlap. Section 8 expects the
worst of an interlocking directorate in that it assumes the common director
to bring about the most anticompetitive consequence. The test for legality is
whether a competition-eliminating agreement between the two competitors
would be illegal under any of the antitrust laws. Given that price fixing cartel
is the most harmful conduct between two competitors, § 8 essentially means
that if a price fixing agreement between two firms would be illegal, the
interlocking directorate would be illegal even though an exclusive dealing
agreement or a joint venture between the two firms would be upheld. 242
Interlocking directorate between two vertically related firms is generally
legal under the statute since the firms are not competitors.243 It is fair to say
that interlocking directorate has not been an enforcement priority of the two
U.S. Agencies. However, in 2009, the Federal Trade Commission did launch
a high-profile investigation of interlocking directorate between Google and
Apple. 244 The investigation caused the resignation of Eric Schmidt, the thenchief executive officer of Google, from Apple’s board. 245

240 On the contrary, the EU does not seem to put much focus on potential competition as a competitive
concern for conglomerate mergers. There is no mention of loss of potential competition in the
conglomerate merger section of the EU Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
241 Clayton Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (2012).
242 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW AND COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE § 12.11 (4th ed. 2011).
243 Id. Common remedies of interlocking directorate include elimination of the interlock and
prohibitions of future interlock. Damages are theoretically available, but have yet to be awarded to private
parties. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 430 (6th ed. 2007).
244 Miguel Helft & Brad Stone, Board Ties at Apple and Google Are Scrutinized, N.Y. TIMES (May
4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/05/technology/companies/05apple.html?_r=0.
245 David Goldman, Google CEO Schmidt leaves Apple board, CNN MONEY (Aug. 3, 2009, 9:39
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/08/03/technology/schmidt_google_apple_board/.
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8. Merger Review
Merger review can be an effective means to control the conglomerate
problem by preventing their emergence in the first place or by preventing
them from continuing to grow (at least for growth by acquisition). Both the
United States and the EU regulate conglomerate mergers (in the case of the
United States, it at least used to). However, the way these mergers are
regulated in these two jurisdictions would not address the concerns about
conglomerates highlighted in this article. In the United States, regulation of
conglomerate mergers was focused on either the loss of potential competition
or increased risks of exclusionary practices, such as reciprocity, tying, or
predatory pricing. 246 Likewise, in the EU, the main focus in regulating
conglomerate mergers is on potential foreclosure effects through tying
practices. The regulatory focus is not on sheer size as such, but on potential
risks of impairment of competition or anticompetitive conduct. Therefore,
while merger review will help to tackle some of the specific concerns about
conglomerates, such as elimination of potential competition, tying, or
predatory pricing, it will not address the root of the problem itself.
Merger review can be used to ensure that effective potential competition
is preserved. According to the 1984 Guidelines, there are two potential
competition theories: perceived potential competition and actual potential
competition. Under the perceived potential competition theory,
[b]y eliminating a significant present competitive threat that
constrains the behavior of the firms already in the market, the merger
could result in an immediate deterioration in market performance. . . .
If the acquiring firm had unique advantages in entering the market, the
firms in the market might be able to set a new and higher price after
the threat of entry by the acquiring firm was eliminated by the
merger. 247

Under the actual potential competition theory,
[b]y eliminating the possibility of entry by the acquiring firm in a more
procompetitive manner, the merger could result in a lost opportunity
for improvement in market performance resulting from the addition of
a significant competitor. The more procompetitive alternatives
include both new entry and entry through a ‘toehold’ acquisition of a
present small competitor. 248

246 HOVENKAMP, supra note 242, § 13.3. Professor Hovenkamp, however, notes that these risks are
more often imagined than real.
247 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 176, § 4.111.
248 Id. § 4.112.
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According to the Guidelines, when evaluating potential competition
concerns, the Department of Justice will focus on a number of factors,
including: (1) market concentration, (2) conditions of entry, (3) the acquiring
firm’s entry advantage, and (4) the market share of the acquired firm. 249
In the Marine Bancorporation case, the Supreme Court defined the
perceived potential competition doctrine as consisting of the following three
elements:
if the target market is substantially concentrated, if the acquiring firm
has the characteristics, capabilities, and economic incentive to render
it a perceived potential de novo entrant, and if the acquiring firm’s
premerger presence on the fringe of the target market in fact tempered
oligopolistic behavior on the part of existing participants in that
market. 250

The Court in that case expressly reserved the issue of whether actual potential
competition is a recognized doctrine under U.S. merger review law. 251
Merger review can also be used to prevent situations of mutual
forbearance from arising in the first place. While the idea is simple in theory,
the difficulty lies in determining when mutual interdependence is likely to
arise. It cannot be the rule that mergers are prohibited whenever a
conglomerate enters by acquisition a market in which other conglomerates
operate, when these conglomerates also compete in another market. Cases in
which the leverage for mutual forbearance is an important sales or supply
relationship are relatively easier. The competition authority can simply
prohibit a conglomerate from acquiring a firm that is an important supplier
or customer of another conglomerate. Cases in which the leverage for mutual
forbearance is relative weakness in a market present more difficulties. The
authority cannot prohibit a merger simply because the target is weak and
would become a source of leverage for rivals. However, Areeda and Turner
have noted that this kind of acquisition is highly unlikely. 252
Areeda and Turner have proposed an analytical framework to determine
when intervention is justified in cases in which mutual interdependence
increases the likelihood of express or tacit collusion. They stipulate three
249

Id. §§ 4.131–4.134.
418 U.S. at 624–25.
251 Id. at 625.
252 Phillip Areeda & Donald Turner, Conglomerate Mergers: Extended Interdependence and Effects
on Interindustry Competition as Grounds for Condemnation, 127 U. PENN L. REV. 1082, 1089 (1979) (“A
firm with a strong position in one market would have no incentive to acquire a vulnerable firm in a second
market if the principal effect of that acquisition were to reduce its perceived ability to make profitmaximizing moves in the first market. Nor is there any reason for a firm vulnerable in one market to
acquire a strong firm in a second market if the vulnerability reduced its felt ability to exploit the strong
firm’s position.”).
250
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necessary conditions for intervention: (1) “[t]he merged firm and at least one
rival must confront each other in two markets, each of which is somewhat
oligopolistic in performance but not rigidly so,” 253 (2) “[t]he merged firm and
at least one other two-market firm must both be significant in both markets,
and both markets must be relatively important to both firms,” 254 and (3) “[t]o
be deterred from a price cut in one market a firm must be subject to sanctions
in the second market.” 255 The condition for a somewhat but not rigidly
oligopolistic market is due to the fact that if the market is already rigidly
oligopolistic, competition probably cannot get much worse. 256 There is not
much to worry about. Significance is relevant because if the two firms are
not significant forces in the market, their actions will not affect overall
market performance. 257 Importance is relevant because if the market is not
important to the two firms, they will not be affected by losses in it. 258
Following Bernheim and Whinston’s theory about transfer of surplus
enforcement power, the competition authority would also want to pay
attention to whether (1) one market is rapidly growing and the other is slowgrowing, (2) one market is one in which actions are directly observable and
immediately punishable and the other one in which there are substantial
detection and punishment lags, or (3) one market has high demand and the
other has low demand. These pairings of markets would raise the likelihood
and severity of sanction.
Despite the limited effectiveness of merger review in tackling the
conglomerate problem, it is correct after all that it is only used to target
specific competitive concerns or conduct that may arise from a merger, such
as mutual interdependence, loss of potential competition, or increased risks
for exclusionary conduct, as opposed to being used to regulate size. Any
attempt to use merger review to prevent conglomerates from emerging in the
first place or growing would be inevitably arbitrary. Questions such as what
qualifies as a conglomerate, what should be the limit of size, how should size
be measured, etc. will necessitate some arbitrary line drawing. Any rules that
can be formulated will also be highly complex and prescriptive, as is
evidenced by the Japanese rules on excessive concentration of economic
power. Finally, to the extent that a conglomerate is family-owned, which
many conglomerates in emerging economies are, restrictions on the growth
of conglomerates can be circumvented through some family shareholding
trusts or other mechanisms. They are unlikely to be effective.
253

Id. at 1084.
Id. at 1085.
255 Id. at 1086.
256 Id. at 1085.
257 Id. at 1086.
258 Id.
254
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VI. THE CASE OF HONG KONG
A. Overview of Competition Law in Hong Kong
Hong Kong was one of the last developed economies to adopt a crosssector competition law. Prior to 2012, the government had espoused a
sectoral approach to competition law, having in place competition law
provisions in the sector-specific regulations for the telecom and broadcasting
sectors. This is despite the fact that there had been vocal public demand for
a cross-sector competition law since the 1990s, when the Consumer Council,
a statutory consumer advocacy body, recommended that Hong Kong adopt
one. One of the main reasons for the public demand for competition law,
contrary to the conventional conception of the objective of competition law,
is not to obtain greater protection for consumer welfare. It is the long held
perception that the local economy is dominated by conglomerates, most of
which are family-owned and heavily involved in property development. 259
One study concludes that the corporate assets held by the fifteen largest
families in Hong Kong accounted for 84.2% of GDP, and that the five largest
corporate groups controlled 32.1% of the market capitalization in Hong Kong
in 1996. 260
The conglomerates have been accused of a variety of conduct, such as
collusion, tying, refusal to deal, predatory pricing, and exploitative practices
against suppliers. They have also been accused of squeezing out SMEs and
excessive pricing, especially in the property management sector. There are
high public expectations that the newly enacted Competition Ordinance will
address the dominance of conglomerates in Hong Kong. While some of the
alleged conduct clearly falls within the purview of competition law, others
can present difficulty. For instance, the exploitative practices against
suppliers are generally tackled under the rubric of unfair trade practices,
which the Hong Kong Competition Ordinance does not regulate, in other
jurisdictions. Even though tying is clearly one of the prohibited business
practices under competition law, it is mostly regulated as an abuse of
dominance. The problem is that in Hong Kong, the alleged perpetrators of
tying usually do not command a dominant position in their relevant markets.

259 Due to the lack of inhabitable land in the city, property development is one of the most important
sectors of the economy. See Hong Kong Monetary Authority, The Property Market and the MacroEconomy, QUARTERLY BULLETIN 05/2001, 1 (2001), http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/publicationand-research/quarterly-bulletin/qb200105/fa02.pdf.
260 Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership and Control
in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 108 (2000).
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B. An Overview of Conglomerate Dominance in Hong Kong
As mentioned earlier, some commentators have drawn a distinction
between conglomerates and corporate groups. In Hong Kong, no such
distinction is drawn. A conglomerate refers to a business group which
operates in multiple sectors of the economy through its subsidiaries. Most of
the conglomerates in Hong Kong are family-owned, especially those that
were established by a local founder and not descended from the British
trading houses from the colonial times. Some of the more prominent
conglomerates in Hong Kong include the Cheung Kong Group, Sun Hung
Kai, Henderson Land, the New World Group, Swire Pacific, and Jardine
Matheson. In particular, the owner of the Cheung Kong Group, Li Ka Shing,
is the richest man in Asia and the seventeenth richest man in the world,
according to Forbes. 261 Lee Shau Kee, the owner of Henderson Land, is the
twenty-seventh richest man in the world.262 The fact that two men from a
place as small as Hong Kong can be ranked among the top thirty richest men
in the world underscores the degree of concentration of wealth in the city.
Studies have produced a range of results on aggregate concentration in
Hong Kong. Claessens and his coauthors find that the ten largest families in
Hong Kong controlled about a third of the corporate sector and that the five
largest family groups controlled 32.1% of the market capitalization in Hong
Kong. 263 Masulis and his coauthors find slightly lower figures. They report
that 15.63% of the listed firms in Hong Kong belonged to family groups and
26.29% of the market capitalization was accounted for by such groups. 264
According to Poon, listed companies controlled by the six leading
conglomerates accounted for 14.7% of the total market capitalization of the
Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2010. 265 This is after significant dilution of
the Hong Kong stock market by Mainland companies. Eight years earlier, the
same companies were responsible for 23.5% of the market capitalization in
Hong Kong. 266 It has also been estimated that the six biggest conglomerates
in Hong Kong take in at least 23 cents of every dollar spent by the city’s
residents. 267
The Economist has come up with a slightly different way of measuring
261 Chase Peterson-Withorn, Forbes Billionaires: Full List of The 500 Richest People in the World
2015, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2015, 7:00AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chasewithorn/2015/03/02/forbesbillionaires-full-list-of-the-500-richest-people-in-the-world-2015/.
262 Id.
263 Claessens, Djankov & Lang, supra note 260, at 83, 108.
264 Masulis et al., supra note 22, at 3569.
265 ALICE POON, LAND AND THE RULING CLASS IN HONG KONG 23 (2011).
266 Id.
267 Te-ping Chen, Hong Kong’s Tycoons Under Attack, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2012, 2:59AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444230504577615212739865968.
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the concentration of aggregate concentration. It publishes what is known as
the Crony Capitalism Index, which calculates “the total wealth of those of
the world’s billionaires who are active mainly in rent-heavy industries,”
which refer to industries that are more susceptible to rent-seeking, such as
(1) casinos; (2) coal, palm oil, and timber; (3) defense; (4) commercial and
investment banking; (5) infrastructure and pipelines; (6) oil, gas, chemicals,
and other energy; (7) ports and airports; (8) real estate and construction; (9)
steel, other metals, mining, and commodities; and (10) utilities and telecom
services. 268 Unsurprisingly, Hong Kong came out on top in the Index, with
close to 80% of the city’s GDP accounted for by billionaires in the so-called
“crony sectors.” Hong Kong’s percentage is almost four times as high as
Russia’s, which came out number two in the Index. 269 Hong Kong’s
preponderance in these crony sectors is all the more remarkable because it is
basically entirely absent in six of the ten enumerated sectors, including
casinos, coal, defense, infrastructure, oil and gas, and steel and mining. Hong
Kong is a major financial center. Therefore, it is not surprising that finance
accounts for a significant proportion of the GDP. However, it is important to
bear in mind that the Index does not calculate the percentage of GDP
accounted for by a particular sector, but by the total wealth of billionaires
operating in that sector. Most of the major financial institutions in Hong
Kong are multinational corporations. The owners of these institutions are not
local billionaires, and hence would not be counted towards the Index. What
then accounts for the extraordinary high percentage of local GDP attributed
to the crony sectors? The answer lies in the real estate sector.
The real estate or the property sector has always been one of the most
important sectors in the local economy, especially since the departure of
manufacturing for Mainland China in the 1980s. The local economy has been
inextricably linked to the swings of the property market ever since the 1980s.
The economy expanded rapidly during the prehandover rally in the real estate
market from the late-1980s all the way to the Asian Financial Crisis. And the
economy was in doldrums for years when the property market collapsed
dramatically during the Asian Financial Crisis. It is no coincidence that
practically all the major conglomerates in Hong Kong are involved in the
property sector. Cheung Kong, Sun Hung Kai, and Henderson Land are three
of the largest property development companies in Hong Kong. 270 The other
268 Planet Plutocrat: Our crony-capitalism index, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 15, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21599041-countries-where-politically-connectedbusinessmen-are-most-likely-prosper-planet.
269 Id.
270 Jackie Connor, Hong Kong: Economic Freedom Belies Crony Capitalism, SEVEN PILLARS
INSTITUTE (Oct. 1, 2014), http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/news/economics/hong-kong-economicfreedom-belies-crony-capitalism.
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conglomerates such as New World, Jardine Matheson, Swire Pacific, and
Hong Kong Land also have significant presence in the real estate sector. The
property sector is especially crucial in Hong Kong as compared to other
economies largely because of the scarcity of land in the city. The city has an
area of barely over 1,100 square kilometers, 24% of which consisted of builtup areas as of 2013. 271 76% of the total land area is nonbuilt-up land that is
scattered across the city in the form of woodland, grassland, wetland, and
agricultural land. 272 According to the government, over 500 square
kilometers of the city’s land is unsuitable for development as it consists of
country parks, remote areas, small islands, and steep slopes. 273
What compounds the land scarcity problem is the fact that the
government is practically the sole supplier of undeveloped land and has long
adopted a high land price policy. 274 Land sales account for a significant part
of the government’s revenue and therefore the government has had every
incentive to keep land, and by extension, property prices high. According to
government data, land sales accounted for between 15% and 20% of the total
government revenue from 2012 to 2015. 275 During the heyday of the property
market boom, land sales contributed to as much as 30% of the total
government revenue.276 Stamp duties, which are collected from property
transactions, contributed another 10% of revenue to the government
coffers. 277 In fact, from April to September 2014, stamp duties accounted for
more than a quarter of the overall government revenue. 278 Therefore,
property-related revenue sources altogether contribute to more than 30% of
the government revenue. It is no coincidence that property prices in Hong
Kong have been some of the highest in the world. According to the
Telegraph, Hong Kong is the second most expensive place in the world to
buy residential property, more expensive than New York, London, and
Tokyo, and just after Monaco, a tiny principality in the south of France. 279
Hong Kong also has the second highest commercial property rental in the
271 Hong Kong Government Central Policy Unit, Commission on Strategic Development: Land
Utilisation and Land Supply to Support Economic Development of Hong Kong 1 (Nov. 2013),
http://www.cpu.gov.hk/doc/en/commission_strategic_development/csd_3_2013e.pdf.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 POON, supra note 265, at 44.
275 Legislative Council Secretariat Research Office, Fact Sheet: Major sources of government revenue
1
(2015),
http://www.legco.gov.hk/research-publications/english/1415fs03-major-sources-ofgovernment-revenue-20141215-e.pdf.
276 POON, supra note 265, at 113.
277 Legislative Council Secretariat, supra note 275, at 1.
278 Id.
279 The world’s 10 most expensive cities to buy property, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 5, 2015),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/property/international/10675352/The-worlds-10-most-expensivecities-to-buy-property.html?frame=2440091.
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world after London. 280
The property development market in Hong Kong is highly concentrated.
By all accounts, the market has become more concentrated over the last two
decades. According to a Consumer Council study, 70% of total new private
housing was supplied by seven developers and 46% by three developers. 281
Moreover, two of the major developers, Sun Hung Kai Properties and
Henderson Land, allegedly held an enormous land bank. 282 By 2010, the top
four developers accounted for 74% of all new apartments sold and the top
two developers held 60% of the market. 283 By 2014, the top three developers
supplied 72% of the new apartments sold in Hong Kong. 284 In fact, one report
suggests that the private residential market is as concentrated as the top two
developers holding 70% of the market. 285 It is important to note that market
share in residential property carries significance beyond the residential
property market to the market for retail rentals or shopping malls. This is
because in Hong Kong, residential property development has tended to come
in large-scale property developments that consist of tens of buildings sitting
on top of a large shopping mall. Needless to say, the shopping malls thus
built stay in the hands of the developer. Therefore, a high market share in
residential property also indirectly gives a developer significant presence in
the retail rental market, which they use to leverage into the retail sector.
High market shares on their own of course do not give the top property
developers market power. What gives these developers substantial market
power is the high entry barriers to the private residential market. First, the
market suffers from low contestability. No new player has managed to grab
a market share of over 5% since 1981. 286 It does not help that a number of
medium-sized developers failed following the Asian Financial Crisis, further
shielding the top developers from competitive pressure. 287 Second, as
mentioned earlier, a number of the leading developers hold an enormous land
bank through years of acquisition. Others have acquired substantial land

280 Miho Favela, Top 10 Most Expensive Office Markets in the World Revealed, WORLD PROPERTY J.
(Mar.
4,
2015,
9:45AM),
http://www.worldpropertyjournal.com/real-estate-news/unitedkingdom/london-real-estate-news/london-office-rental-rates-2015-most-expensive-office-marketscushman-wakefield-annual-office-space-across-the-world-global-rankings-george-roberts-james-youngjohn-siu-8910.php.
281 POON, supra note 265, at 24, 66.
282 Id. at 25.
283 Vivian Kwok, Two developers tower over market, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 12, 2010),
http://www.scmp.com/article/721930/two-developers-tower-over-market.
284 Sophia Yan, Hong Kong has a tycoon problem, CNN MONEY (Nov. 2, 2014),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/11/02/news/economy/hong-kong-tycoons/.
285 See Connor, supra note 270.
286 POON, supra note 265, at 66.
287 Id. at 57.
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holding through acquisition of utilities companies, whose former plants can
be converted for residential development. 288
So what is the relevance of the substantial market power of the large
conglomerate developers in the property development market for the wider
economy? In Hong Kong, the large conglomerate developers have fulfilled
the prophecy of Winston Churchill when he declared that land monopoly is
the mother of all other forms of monopoly, 289 and have successfully
leveraged their market power in the property development market into other
related markets, such as property management, residential broadband
services, groceries, pharmacy, and even mobile telephony. As will be
explained subsequently, such leveraging of market power is particularly
effective because of the enormous price differential between residential
property and all these other markets such as groceries and broadband
services. The large price differential means that consumers pay scant
attention to these other products or services that are often directly or
indirectly tied to the purchase of an apartment when making the property
purchase. Such lack of consumer attention has magnified the market power
of the conglomerate property developers and has in some sense rendered the
coercion requirement in a standard tying claim superfluous. The
conglomerates have thus been able to strengthen their positions in the
markets for these other products and services through their market power in
the property development market.
C. Assessment of Advantages and Disadvantages of Conglomerates
in Hong Kong
An assessment of the net benefits of conglomerates in Hong Kong is
important because it informs the policy decision as to what should be done
about them. If conglomerates redound net benefits to the city, then they
probably should be tolerated and efforts should be made to contain their
competition-distorting effects by way of competition law enforcement. If
conglomerates on balance cause net harm to the economy, as seems to be the
conclusion in South Korea, then more drastic measures may be needed.
1. How relevant are conglomerate advantages in Hong Kong?
There is no denying that group membership redounds significant
benefits to conglomerate companies. Such efficiency benefits may provide
288 Id. at 115. The land holdings of the large developers took on added significance after the ninepoint plan adopted by the government in 2002, which was enacted in response to the collapse of the
property market and severely curtailed land supply. Id. at 122.
289 STEVEN B. CORD, SOCIETY AT THE CROSSROADS: CHOOSING THE RIGHT ROAD 245 (2003).
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strong justifications for the continual existence of conglomerates. However,
one should note that many of these advantages, such as the provision of
internal capital and factor markets, overcoming missing institutions, and
improving access to the international capital markets, are peculiar, or at least
especially relevant, to emerging economies where legal and financial
institutions are developing. As noted earlier, many of these advantages fade
in significance as economies mature and institutions develop. Thus these
advantages will be of little relevance to conglomerates in Hong Kong, which
is an advanced economy with high-quality institutions and well-developed
capital markets. 290 According to the World Bank Governance Indicators,
Hong Kong had a percentile rank of 89.81 for political stability and no
violence, 98.08 for government effectiveness, 99.52 for regulatory quality,
93.75 for Rule of Law, and 92.31 for control of corruption in 2014. 291
Overcoming missing institutions thus should be irrelevant for Hong Kong
companies. Meanwhile, according to the World Bank, Hong Kong’s stock
market ranked number four in the world behind the United States, China, and
Japan as measured by market capitalization of domestic listed companies.
Access to international capital markets and provision of internal capital
markets are hence not an important concern for Hong Kong companies, at
least for those big enough to raise capital through public share offerings. 292
The most relevant advantages for conglomerates in Hong Kong,
therefore, would be economies of scale and scope, risk sharing, and sharing
of group goodwill. However, it is not entirely clear how relevant the last
advantage is to conglomerates in Hong Kong. Unlike conglomerates in other
countries such as South Korea and India, where group companies often
explicitly incorporate the group name in their corporate identity, it is not
often easy in Hong Kong to discern that a company belongs to a certain
conglomerate. Hong Kong conglomerate companies do not seem keen to
flaunt their group identity. Therefore, the main justifications for
conglomerates in Hong Kong would be economies of scale and scope and
risk sharing. In light of the doubts cast by empirical evidence on the ability
of a conglomerate to reap economies of scale, the efficiency justifications for
conglomerates in Hong Kong are rather thin.

290 According to World Bank data, Hong Kong was the 26th richest economy in the world in 2014 as
measured by GDP per capita. See The World Bank, GDP per capita (current US$),
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.
291 The World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators Project, http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.
292 The World Bank, Data: Market capitalization of listed domestic companies (current US$),
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD.
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2. What is the extent of conglomerate harm in Hong Kong?
Agency costs are a corporate governance problem and not a competition
law problem, even though poor corporate governance may have implications
on the competitive behavior of firms. Therefore, if agency costs are deemed
to be a serious problem in Hong Kong, the solution should be found in
corporate law and not competition law. In any case, empirical evidence seems
to suggest that agency costs are not a serious issue.
Crowding out of SMEs and entrepreneurs has been observed in Hong
Kong. It is widely acknowledged that the conglomerates have squeezed out
SMEs in some sectors, such as groceries, as mom-and-pop stores have met
their demise one after another. 293 While it may not be entirely attributable to
the presence of the conglomerates, studies have suggested that Hong Kong
has lost much of its entrepreneurship over the years and now has a much
lower level of entrepreneurship than the global average. 294 A related reason
for the increasing difficulty of entrepreneurship is the high rental costs. The
high rental costs are partly attributable to the high land price policy of the
government and partly attributable to the market power of the conglomerate
property developers. Many small businesses are priced out of the market by
the high rental costs. 295
The Author is unable to locate studies that attempt to measure the
overall welfare effects of conglomerates on the Hong Kong economy or the
impact of conglomerates on SME access to financial markets. However, it
has been noted that a lack of financing is the main impediment to potential
growth and internationalization for SMEs in Hong Kong. 296 Most founders
of SMEs in Hong Kong “start with very limited equity capital and rely more
on seed capital for new businesses from the founders’ personal savings,
contributions from family and sometimes friends, and from mortgaging their
properties.” 297 There seem to be no studies on SMEs access to bank
293 Razeen Sally, Capitalism’s Halting Progress in Asia, QUADRANT ONLINE (Jan 2, 2016),
https://quadrant.org.au/magazine/2015/12/capitalisms-halting-progress-asia (last visited Sept. 4, 2016).
294 CHINESE UNIV. OF H.K. CTR. FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP, GLOB. ENTREPRENEURSHIP MONITOR
H.K. & SHENZHEN 3 (2009) (“Both Hong Kong and Shenzhen have experienced dramatic drops in
entrepreneurial prevalence since our last studies in 2007 and 2004 respectively.”); id. at 4 (“Hong Kong
has a relatively low level of entrepreneurship”). The 2004 Study already showed that the level of
entrepreneurship in Hong Kong was lower than what one would expect given its level of income. Id. at 5.
295 Katie Hunt, Small businesses are priced off Hong Kong’s streets, BBC NEWS (July 22, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-23366025; Ilaina Jonas, Hong Kong has world’s most expensive
retail space—report, REUTERS (May 12, 2013, 12:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-propertyretail-idUSBRE94C03F20130513.
296 Benjamin Fung, Integrating Financial and Non-Financial Support Measures for Hong Kong Small
and Medium Enterprises, THE H.K. MANAGER, (4th Qtr. 2008), http://www.hkma.org.hk/
hkmanager/hkmgr2008v4/eng/archive/gz.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2016).
297 Id.

95

CHENG (DO NOT DELETE)

3/6/2017 6:21 PM

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

37:35 (2017)

financing, which is probably the most important of financing for SMEs, in
Hong Kong. Meanwhile, according to an IOSCO 2015 report, SMEs in Hong
Kong have not been successful in raising capital in the capital markets. The
equity market is marred by asymmetric regulation that disadvantages SMEs
in getting listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 298 And no Hong Kong
SMEs have successfully issued debt securities. 299 More rigorous studies
would provide more conclusive evidence. But one can surmise that SMEs in
Hong Kong do face limited access to capital. 300
Both the design of the political system and anecdotal evidence suggest
that conglomerates in Hong Kong wield significant political influence. The
political system in Hong Kong is such that the business sector generally, and
the conglomerates in particular, are given substantial direct influence. The
city’s mayor, called the chief executive, is selected by a 1200-member-strong
Election Committee, which is stacked with representatives from the business
sector. In fact, one of the most peculiar features of this committee is the
existence of the corporate vote, whereby certain corporations, including the
major conglomerates, are entitled to their own votes. 301 Corporate entities,
many of which are conglomerates, were wholly or partly responsible for
electing 570 of the 1200 seats on the Election Committee in 2011. 302 This
selection system gives the conglomerates considerable leverage over the
chief executive in a government which is very much executive-led.
Legislation that pertains to public expenditure, political structure or the
operation of the Government must be introduced by the administration. 303
The Legislative Council (“LegCo”), Hong Kong’s parliament, is also stacked
in favor of business interest. There are functional constituencies in LegCo,
which represent a particular profession, such as lawyers or doctors, or a
particular industry, such as logistics or finance.304 In other words, there is a
parliament member for the logistics industry or tourism industry. Many of
the representatives of the functional constituencies have a business
298 THE GROWTH AND EMERGING MKTS. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, SME FIN.
THROUGH CAPITAL MKTS.—FINAL REPORT, 44–45, 49–50 (2015), https://www.iosco.org/library/
pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD493.pdf.
299 Id. at 29.
300 Of course the fact that SMEs face limited access to capital does not mean that it is because they
are squeezed out by conglomerates. The extent to which competition by conglomerates deprives SMEs of
access to capital will have to be determined by more rigorous empirical studies by economists.
301 HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION GOVERNMENT, METHODS FOR SELECTING THE
CHIEF EXECUTIVE IN 2017 AND FOR FORMING THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL IN 2016 24 (2013),
http://www.2017.gov.hk/filemanager/template/en/doc/Con_Doc_e_(FINAL)_with_cover.pdf.
302 Carine Lai, Abolish corporate voting to make Hong Kong elections fairer, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST (Nov. 13, 2014, 5:42 PM), http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/
1638964/abolish-corporate-voting-make-hong-kong-elections-fairer.
303 XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 74 (H.K.).
304 HONG KONG GOV’T, supra note 301, at 31–33.
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background and are beholden to business interests. Together with its leverage
over the chief executive, the business community in Hong Kong is very wellpositioned to exercise political influence over government policies.
There also have been cases of nepotism between government officials
and the conglomerates that suggest that the latter hold significant influence
over public policy. Chin-Man Leung, the Secretary for Buildings and Lands
in 2004, authorized the decision to sell below market price the government’s
stake in a public-private partnership known as the Hunghom Peninsula
Project to two conglomerate developers, the New World Group and Sun
Hung Kai Properties. 305 After his retirement, Leung was offered a lucrative
position in the New World Group. 306 Amid public uproar, Leung eventually
gave up the position. 307 An even more high-profile case was the Rafael Hui
case. Hui was a former Chief Secretary for Administration, which is the
equivalent of a prime minister in the Hong Kong government. In December
2014, Hui was found guilty of receiving bribes from one of the owners of
Sun Hung Kai Properties, Thomas Kwok. 308 In fact, conglomerate influence
on the government goes all the way to the very top. The first Chief Executive
of Hong Kong after the handover, Chee-Hwa Tung, himself hailed from a
tycoon shipping family. During his administration, Ka-Shing Li of the
Cheung Kong Group held a stake in Tung’s company. 309 Even if Li did not
in fact leverage his stake in Tung’s company to influence public policy, the
appearance of potential influence is enough to cause the public to cast doubt
on the impartiality of Tung’s administration, especially given his own close
connections to the conglomerate families. And there are well-documented
instances of the conglomerate developers exerting direct and public influence
over government policies. The conglomerate developers, through their trade
association—the Real Estate Developers’ Association—successfully
torpedoed the Town Planning Bill, which would have introduced greater
transparency and accountability in the town planning process through direct
and public lobbying efforts. 310
D. Possible Responses to Conglomerate Dominance in Hong Kong
The foregoing discussion shows that conglomerate dominance is a

305

POON, supra note 265, at 14.
Id.
307 Id.
308 Stuart Lau, Rafael Hui and Thomas Kwok found guilty of bribery in Hong Kong’s biggest graft
trial, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 19, 2014, 4:42 PM), http://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/article/1665519/rafael-hui-and-thomas-kwok-found-guilty-bribery-hong-kongs-biggest.
309 Morck et al., supra note 4, at 696.
310 POON, supra note 265, at 158–59.
306
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serious problem in Hong Kong. What should be done about it? How should
Hong Kong deploy the twin tools of direct regulation of conglomerate size
and internal operations and competition law enforcement? Applying
competition law to competition-distorting conduct would be uncontroversial.
Conglomerates are not being singled out. They are subject to the same
regulation as everyone else. What is more controversial is whether direct
regulation should be applied. Answering this question entails a three-step
inquiry. The first step is whether the particular economy enjoys net benefits
from the existence and continual growth of conglomerates. If the answer is
yes, conglomerates should be left alone. If the answer is no, then we may
ponder what can be done about them. The second step is to come up with
appropriate measures to tackle conglomerates. An appropriate measure
would be one that is effective without being unduly intrusive. Third, there
remains the question of whether any measures that are proposed to be
adopted would be feasible given the local political climate. Given the
powerful political influence of conglomerates, there needs to be very strong
political will to push through these measures and enforce them.
With respect to Hong Kong, the answer to the last two steps clearly point
to the negative. Regarding the net benefits of conglomerates, while it seems
that none of the advantages of conglomerates have particular salience to
Hong Kong anymore, and therefore probably only a modicum of harm would
tip the net benefits in the negative, a more rigorous and systematic study
would be necessary to draw definitive conclusions. Regarding the
appropriateness of the available regulatory tools, the experiences of Japan
and South Korea have not been encouraging. The measures that have been
adopted in these two jurisdictions are highly prescriptive and hence intrusive,
and yet the consensus seems to be that the chaebols continue to dominate the
South Korean economy. Unless and until better measures can be crafted
effectively to restrict the growth of conglomerates, any regulatory decision
must be made with caution. Lastly, there is an evident lack of political will
to adopt any measures to directly tackle conglomerates in Hong Kong.
Despite the widespread dissatisfaction within the public about conglomerate
dominance, the ethos of positive non-interventionism is so deeply ingrained
in the governance approach in Hong Kong, and the business community has
such a stranglehold over the Hong Kong political system, that there is little
hope that any of these more intrusive measures would ever be adopted. It
took Hong Kong close to twenty years to adopt something as uncontroversial
as a general competition law. It would take a major political upheaval for any
legislative measures to be taken against the conglomerates.
Having established that Hong Kong should eschew direct regulation of
the conglomerates, it remains to be seen what can be done under the recently
adopted Competition Ordinance. The fact that options are available under the
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competition law in other jurisdictions does not mean that they are suitable for
or available in Hong Kong. One glaring omission from the Ordinance is
merger review. Under Section 4 of Schedule 7 of the Ordinance, merger
review is only applicable to the telecom sector. 311 The rest of the economy is
not subject to merger review, which means companies in those sectors can
merge to monopoly free from regulatory oversight. What makes matters
worse is that it is not even possible to challenge a consummated merger under
the equivalent of Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 4 of
Schedule 1 of the Ordinance expressly excludes mergers from the purview
of what are known as the first conduct rule (the equivalent of Section 1) and
the second conduct rule (the equivalent of Section 2). 312 Therefore, concerns
about the loss of potential competition and facilitation of mutual
interdependence as a result of a merger cannot be addressed under the
Ordinance.
The situation is the same for abuse of a superior bargaining position.
The Hong Kong Ordinance does not include any provision on unfair trade
practices, which is the basis for regulating the abuse of a superior bargaining
position in Japan and South Korea. To the extent the abusive conduct can be
said to restrict competition and is perpetrated by a firm with a substantial
degree of market power, it may be possible to pursue it under the second
conduct rule. 313 However, most of these abuses do not directly harm
competition and therefore probably would not meet the requirements of the
second conduct rule. In any case, the second conduct rule only applies to
firms with a substantial degree of market power, which would greatly limit
the reach of the rule in dealing with abuses of superior bargaining position,
as a superior bargaining position need not, and in many cases does not, equate
market power.
Interlocking directorates seems to be a common problem in Hong Kong.
The degree of overlap between the boards of the leading conglomerates
seems to be significant. 314 Whether the Competition Ordinance can be
applied to interlocking directorates is a different matter. Unlike the Clayton
Act, the Ordinance does not contain a section that directly targets
interlocking directorates. Therefore, prosecuting interlocking directorates
would need to be done under the general provisions. The first conduct rule
applies to agreements that restrict competition. 315 The employment contracts
311

Competition Ordinance, (2012) Cap. 619, Sch. 7, § 4 (H.K.).
Id. at Sch. 1, § 4.
313 Id. at § 21.
314 Bryane Michael & Say Goo, Last of the Tai-Pans: Improving the Sustainability of Long-Term
Financial Flows by Improving Hong Kong’s Corporate Governance, 16 AIIFL WORKING PAPER 31
(2013).
315 Competition Ordinance, supra note 311, at § 21.
312
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between the director at issue and his or her two companies would certainly
count as agreements. Whether these agreements restrict competition would
depend on whether potential effect would suffice for the purpose of the rule
or whether actual effect must be proven. If actual restrictive effect is required,
it is unlikely that the first conduct rule can be successfully applied to
interlocking directorates. It would essentially require direct proof that the
director at issue passes on competitively sensitive information between the
two companies which results in a change of competitive behavior. This
would be a rather difficult burden to meet.
As far as mutual interdependence is concerned, if it is expressed in the
form of express collusion, the first conduct rule will readily apply to it. Even
though there is currently no case law under the Ordinance, there are no signs
that the first conduct rule will deviate from the international consensus and
apply to tacit collusion, and it certainly would not apply to mutual
forbearance. As mentioned in Part 0, entry deterrence from the sheer size of
the conglomerate would not be a violation. To the extent deterrence is
achieved through other anticompetitive conduct such as predatory pricing or
parallel exclusion, the authority can pursue such conduct directly.
Parallel exclusion would be a very helpful enforcement tool against
conglomerates in Hong Kong. There has been anecdotal evidence of conduct
that is suggestive of parallel exclusion, such as the overbuying of land by
some of the conglomerate property developers to deprive smaller developers
of supply and the pursuit of predatory pricing by two leading supermarket
chains, both of which are conglomerate companies, in response to market
entry in 1999. 316 The question is whether it is possible to fit the theory of
parallel exclusion into the strictures of the Ordinance. Hemphill and Wu
suggest a number of possibilities under U.S. antitrust law, such as shared
monopoly, conspiracy to monopolize, Section 5 of the FTC Act, and the
aggregation doctrine under Section 1. Unfortunately, none of these would be
possible under Hong Kong law. There is no doctrine of conspiracy to
monopolize and shared monopoly under the second conduct rule, which
explicitly refers to substantial degree of market power by an undertaking.
Nor is there, at least not yet, an aggregation doctrine under the first conduct
rule. There is also no equivalent of the unfair methods of competition prong
under Section 5 of the FTC Act. However, all hope is not lost. One saving
grace under the second conduct rule is that its market power threshold is
much lower than the monopoly power required under Section 2. Although
the precise amount of market power required remains to be determined by

316 Mark Williams, The Supermarket Sector in China and Hong Kong: A Tale of Two Systems, 3
COMPETITION L. REV. 251, 265 (2007).
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the courts, the expectation is that 30% to 40% would suffice. 317 Therefore, it
would be possible for the authority to go after conglomerate companies for
parallel exclusion one by one under the second conduct rule.
As discussed earlier, one of the major problems with prosecuting
conglomerates for predatory pricing is the difficulty in taking into
consideration the possibility of multimarket recoupment. In reality, it would
be very difficult to ascertain the quantum of recoupment in markets in which
the conglomerate company did not raise price, but merely avoided the
prospect of price cutting by an aggressive but now deterred entrant.
Thankfully, the Competition Ordinance, as currently interpreted by the Hong
Kong Competition Commission (HKCC), allows for some flexibility
regarding recoupment. According to Section 5.7 of the Guidelines issued by
the HKCC on the second conduct rule, the Commission “may, at its
discretion, consider the extent to which the predating undertaking is in the
longer term able to ‘recoup’ its short term losses stemming from the below
cost pricing.” 318 Therefore, at least as interpreted by the HKCC, prospect of
recoupment is not a necessary component in a predatory pricing claim, unlike
under U.S. antitrust law. This flexibility would allow the HKCC to consider
evidence of multimarket recoupment when such evidence is available, but
would not require the HKCC to reject a predatory pricing claim simply
because successful recoupment cannot be proved. Whether the Competition
Tribunal, which adjudicates competition cases brought by the HKCC, will
adopt the same position remains to be seen.
There have been many instances of tying reported in the media and in
regulatory decisions over the years involving the conglomerates. In
particular, most of the ties have involved the sale of property tied with the
sale of other ancillary services such as property management services, 319
household broadband services, 320 or even retail services such as supermarkets
and pharmacies. 321 With property management services, the modus operandi
is usually that the property developer would reserve the right to appoint the
317 Thomas K. Cheng, Ready for Action: Looking Ahead to the Implementation of Hong Kong’s
Competition Ordinance, 5 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRACTICE 88, 93 (2014).
318 H.K. COMPETITION COMM’N, GUIDELINE ON THE SECOND CONDUCT RULE 30 (2015),
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/guidance/second_conduct_rule/files/Guideline_The
_Second_Conduct_Rule_Eng.pdf.
319 Ngai Ming Yip, Management Rights in Multi-owned Properties in Hong Kong, in Multi-owned
Housing: Law, Power and Practice 121 (eds. Sarah Blandy, Ann Depuis & Jennifer Dixon, 2010); Hong
Kong Legislative Council, Amendments to Motion on “Improving Property Management and Operation
of Owners’ Corporations” 2 (March 21, 2013), http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/english/counmtg/
motion/m_papers/cm0327cb3-452-e.pdf.
320 T 261/03, OFFICE OF TELECOMMS. AUTH., COMPLAINTS ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE
PROVISION OF TEL. & INTERNET ACCESS SERVS. AT BANYAN GARDEN ESTATE (2003).
321 Williams, supra note 316, at 264.
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property management company before the property is sold. Most of the
conglomerate property developers in Hong Kong also own a property
management company as a subsidiary, and the property manager appointed
would almost invariably be the affiliate. In other words, the sale of the
property management service would be tied to the sale of residential
property. With household broadband services, the famous case was the
Banyan Garden case, in which the Office of Telecommunications Authority,
the previous telecom regulator, received a complaint that residents of Banyan
Garden had no choice but to use the broadband service provided by an
affiliate of the property developer. 322 In this instance, the sale of household
broadband service was tied to the sale of residential property. With retail
services, this is particular to one of the conglomerate property developers. It
has long been observed that the shopping malls of its residential properties
would only have its own affiliate supermarket, pharmacy, and electronics
retailer. All of these three markets in Hong Kong are essentially duopolies
with a number of small fringe competitors. The chief rivals of the
supermarket, pharmacy, and electronics retailer of this conglomerate are
almost never seen in its shopping malls. Viewed from a tying perspective,
retail services in supermarket, pharmacy, and electronics are tied to the sale
of residential property.
The HKCC, in its Guidelines on the Second Conduct Rule, essentially
follows the prevailing U.S. and EU approaches of requiring: (1) two distinct
products, (2) existence of a tie, meaning consumers are coerced to buy the
two products together, (3) market power in the tying product market, and (4)
anticompetitive foreclosure in the tied product market. 323 There are, however,
problems with applying this four-part framework to the tying cases described
above. First, it is not entirely clear that the property developer at issue has
sufficient market power in the relevant market. It was mentioned earlier that,
by some measures, the two leading property developers in Hong Kong have
around 30% market share each in the firsthand residential property market.
This may turn out to be insufficient for the market share threshold of the
second conduct rule. Even if that were sufficient, it is not clear that the
relevant market should be confined to firsthand residential property or should
be residential property in general. If the relevant market is the latter, the
developer’s market share is surely much lower than 30%. And there are good
arguments that residential property in general should be the relevant market
as firsthand and secondhand residential properties seem to be reasonable
substitutes in the eyes of the buyers. Therefore, there is likely to be
322 Thomas K. Cheng, A Tale of Two Competition Law Regimes—the Telecom-Sector Competition
Regulation in Hong Kong and Singapore, 30 WORLD COMPETITION 501, 522–524 (2007).
323 GUIDELINE ON THE SECOND CONDUCT RULE, supra note 318, at 31–32.
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insufficient market power for the purpose of the second conduct rule. Second,
at least in the context of retail services, it is not clear that the coercion element
is present. Consumers are not forced to purchase property and those retail
services from the same conglomerate. They are free to go elsewhere for their
grocery shopping, personal care products, or electronics. Consumers tend to
visit those stores in their estate’s shopping mall because of proximity.
All this may mean that the instances of tying enumerated above may be
beyond the reach of the second conduct rule. However, this Author believes
that when the value of the tying product and the value of the tied product
differ so drastically—USD $2 million for a residential property versus USD
$30 a month for household broadband service or USD $50 for groceries—
the requirement for market power in the tying product and the coercion
requirement become meaningless. The reason for requiring that the seller
have market power in the tying product market is to ensure that consumers
are truly forced by a lack of reasonable substitutes in the tying product market
to purchase the tied product. Otherwise, the tie would inflict no harm as
consumers are free to go elsewhere. When the value of tying product dwarves
that of the tied product, consumers are simply not going to take the tied
product into account when purchasing the tying product, and they are simply
not going to switch to another tying product in reaction to the tie even though
alternatives are available. In the eyes of the consumers, the tied product is
simply too insignificant in the purchase decision for the tying product.
This does not, however, mean that consumers do not care about the lack
of choice in household broadband service or property management service
once they have purchased the residential property, as evidenced by the
consumer complaints that arise after the fact. The fact that consumers were
not mindful of the deprivation of choice when they purchased the residential
property does not mean that they do not value the choice. It also does not
mean that there is no foreclosure effect on competing household broadband
service or property management service providers. The main reason that
competition law prohibits tying is not because it limits consumer choice, but
because it forecloses the tied product market. 324 Given the substantial market
share of this property developer (even though it falls short of what it required
for the second conduct rule), there is going to be significant foreclosure
effect. Competing grocers are effectively foreclosed from 20% to 30% of the
market because they are not allowed to rent in shopping malls owned by that
developer. 325 The foreclosure effect is particularly significant for property
324

HOVENKAMP, supra note 242, at §§ 10.6a–b.
And in Hong Kong, geographical proximity to the residences of the shoppers is very important for
supermarkets because most residents do not drive to do their grocery shopping. Most of them walk to the
nearby supermarkets. And it has been found that most of them would not walk more than 500 meters for
groceries. See H.K. CONSUMER COUNCIL, GROCERY MKT. STUDY: MKT. POWER OF SUPERMARKET
325
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management services, as it seems that many of the property developers in
Hong Kong have the same practice. There is a serious concern of parallel
exclusion of rival unaffiliated property management service companies.
Therefore, the proposed rule is when there is a huge discrepancy between the
value of the tying product and that of the tied product, the market power
requirement for the tying product and the coercion requirement should be
relaxed.
Against the high public expectations for the recently enacted
Competition Ordinance, it seems that it would not be able to tackle the root
of the problem, which is the domination of the local economy by
conglomerates. In order to do that, Hong Kong may need to consider some
more drastic measures, such as what Japan and Korea have in place in their
competition laws, which have largely proven to be ineffective and highly
intrusive. There is also an absence of the requisite political will to enact such
measures. In the end, the citizenry of Hong Kong may have to accept that
conglomerate dominance is here to stay and the most that competition law
can do is to limit the extent of the damage wrought by the conglomerate’s
anticompetitive conduct. This is not to say that improvements cannot be
made to the current Competition Ordinance. The most obvious one would be
to extent merger review beyond the telecom sector to the rest of the economy.
That would allow the HKCC to safeguard against the loss of potential
competition or the creation of mutual interdependence in conglomerate
merger cases. One can also consider the introduction of a provision directly
regulating interlocking directorate and the expansion of the second conduct
rule to cover parallel exclusion scenarios. And if there is a desire to tackle of
exploitative practices, the second conduct rule can be revised to apply to
exploitative practices as well as exclusionary practices.
VII. CONCLUSION
The goal of this article is to highlight a competition problem that has
been long overlooked by the two leading competition law jurisdictions in the
world, the United States and the EU. It presents a two-step framework for
determining the correct response to conglomerate dominance in an economy.
Given the size of these two continental-scale economies, it is no surprise that
no conglomerates dominate these economies. The same cannot be said about
small economies and emerging economies, which tend to be less dynamic
and more prone to conglomeration. Once conglomerates have emerged and
solidified their positions, there are two options available: direct regulation of
CHAINS UNDER SCRUTINY 36 (2013),
reports/20131219.html.
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their size and internal operations or competition law enforcement against
their anticompetitive conduct. The former, which requires an assessment of
net benefits of conglomerates, can be said to be a direct challenge to the
notion of conglomerates. It is often clumsy and ineffective, not to mention
highly intrusive. It is of questionable merit. Therefore, if it is believed that
mere regulation of their anticompetitive conduct is insufficient, the first line
of defense against conglomerates would seem to be to prevent them from
emerging in the first place, i.e., through merger review. However, the kind of
conglomerate merger review existing under U.S. and EU law, which focuses
on elimination of potential competition and foreclosure effects through tying
and reciprocity, would not serve this purpose. To prevent conglomerates
from becoming too big that they acquire excessive economic power and
political influence, regulation based on size would be necessary. Merger
review based on size alone, however, would be fraught with difficulty.
The alternative would be to accept that, just like with abuse of
dominance or monopolization—competition law does not regulate
dominance or monopoly power, but only the abuse of it—it should equally
leave conglomerates and their economic power alone and only regulate
instances where there is anticompetitive conduct. Yet there is an important
difference between monopoly power and conglomerate economic power.
One reason that we do not directly regulate monopoly power is the belief that
if left to market forces, monopoly power will eventually be eroded away by
new entrants or new products. Monopoly power does not last. In contrast,
experience tends to show that conglomerates endure and they are not eroded
away by new entrants or new products. Short of catastrophic investment
decisions like the ones made by the Daewoo Group in South Korea,
conglomerates are unlikely to disappear. Even if one does, many others
remain. By virtue of their vastness and multimarket operations, there would
need to be simultaneous new entrants or new products in many markets to
threaten a conglomerate, which is highly unlikely. Given the durable nature
of conglomerates, intervention against their economic power is more justified
than intervention against monopoly power. The problem is finding the right
approach. Drawing a line based on size would be arbitrary and susceptible to
circumvention. Yet there seems to be no better way to prevent the
concentration of economic power in small and emerging economies. This is
a conundrum that would require further serious thinking.
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